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THE COST OF CONSENT: OPTIMAL STANDARDIZATION IN
THE LAW OF CONTRACT
Joshua Fairfield*
ABSTRACT
This Article argues that informed consent to contract terms is not a good to
be maximized, but an information cost that courts should minimize. As a
result, courts ought to minimize the cost sum of information costs and
contractual surprise. The Article applies information-cost theory to show that
information-forcing rules are often inefficient at both the micro- and
macroeconomic levels. Such rules also impose greater costs on third parties
than the benefits they create for the contracting parties. When one consumer
creates an idiosyncratic deal, the information-savings benefits of
standardization are reduced for all other potential consumers. The Article
demonstrates that in some cases courts are already abandoning a rigid view of
contractual consent when consent is too costly; but that under other doctrines,
courts insist on an inefficient level of informed contractual consent.
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“DAD! Too. Much. Information!”
—Author’s daughter, age 6.
INTRODUCTION
In contract theory, consent is indispensable and standardization
disfavored.1 In practice, consent is costly, and standardization is the solution.
This Article attempts to realign contract law with the broader discourse on
standardization. It argues that contractual consent is an information cost and
proposes that standardization is the way to reduce that cost.
Traditional theories of contract treat consent as an indispensable expression
of will, of autonomy, or as a vital element of an ongoing relationship.
Economic theories of contract, especially those in the Coasean tradition, have
treated consent as incidental to negotiation over contract defaults. The
Coasean bargain requires that a contracting party be able to gain its
counterparty’s contractual consent with minimal transaction costs.2 As a
result, economists have not strongly focused on consent as a transaction cost,
and almost none have focused on it as an information cost.3
Traditional contract theories malign standardized contracts for increasing
information costs.4 The usual argument is that standardized contracts hide or
backload terms, confuse consumers, and raise the costs of information.5 But
1 See Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 900 (1994) (“Consent is the
master concept that defines the law of contracts in the United States. . . . [It] expresses the primacy of
individualistic values in our culture. To say that one cannot be bound by a promise that one did not voluntarily
and knowingly make is to say that the individual should be the author of her own undertakings . . . .”). For an
in-depth discussion of the role of consent in contracting, see Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay
in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1179–80 (1983).
2 See David M. Driesen & Shubha Ghosh, The Functions of Transaction Costs: Rethinking Transaction
Cost Minimization in a World of Friction, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 61, 68 (2005) (“Coase claimed that absent
transaction costs, parties could simply bargain around an inefficient decision made by a court . . . .”).
3 See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate
Contracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 715–16 (1997) (“[W]e present a
theoretical, institutional, and empirical analysis of two independent, but conceptually related, forces that
influence the balance of standardization, customization, and innovation in contracts: learning externalities and
network externalities.”).
4 See Amy J. Schmitz, Embracing Unconscionability’s Safety Net Function, 58 ALA. L. REV. 73, 105–06
(2006) (“Courts, therefore, may apply unconscionability as a substitute for market correction prevented by
sellers’ monopoly power and purchasers’ high information costs. In this way, unconscionability provides
courts with means for checking whether contracts are truly products of contractual liberty.”).
5 Standardization has two meanings, rarely distinguished. The first refers to a drafter repeatedly offering
the same contractual terms to all potential counterparties. For example, a widget manufacturer might offer the
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everywhere else that standardization is studied (for example, standardization in
industrial manufacture, computer programming, or medical consent),
standardization lowers the cost of information.6 Thus, the anti-standardization
doctrines of adhesion and unconscionability seem adrift in an age of
mechanized production and electronic contracting.
A simple example shows why the leading views of consent and
standardization are incomplete. Suppose you buy a cup of coffee. You have
not consented to the fine print on the coffee cup in any way that is worth
mentioning. You know roughly what is in the contract; it is, after all,
standardized. There is no need to read it. Indeed, it would be an economic
tragedy if you did read the fine print. The time cost of doing so might well
exceed the benefit to you of purchasing the coffee. The cost of obtaining your
consent could kill the deal.
This Article contradicts the received wisdom of contract theory. I focus on
the cost of consent, rather than its presence or absence. This redefines the
question of consent. The relevant question, I posit, is not whether the customer
has purchased enough information to have meaningfully consented to the
contract. Rather, the important question is how much information is efficient
for the consumer to purchase. I also propose that standardization reduces,
rather than increases, the information costs of consent. As a result, I propose
that courts should minimize the cost sum of contractual consent and surprise,
just as they minimize the cost sum of precautions and accidents in torts.
Finally, I propose that courts reconsider the use of information-forcing rules in
the mass-market context.

same contract to everyone. The second refers to standardization across drafters. For example, every widget
manufacturer may come to offer the same or similar terms. Both are important for consumers who seek to
reduce information costs. A consumer suffers lower information costs if the cup of Starbucks coffee she buys
today is subject to the same terms and conditions as the cup of Starbucks coffee she bought yesterday. This
saves the consumer time because she does not have to relearn the terms of each deal. But consumers also
benefit if the standardized contract they receive from Starbucks is substantially the same as the deal they get
from Daily Grind.
6 See Joseph M. Perillo, Neutral Standardizing of Contracts, 28 PACE L. REV. 179, 180–84 (2008)
(discussing the literature of standardization outside of contract); see also Mark A. Hall, A Theory of Economic
Informed Consent, 31 GA. L. REV. 511, 512 (1997) (discussing the “fundamental incompatibility of
conventional informed consent theory and modern economic reality”); Schuck, supra note 1, at 903–05
(discussing the costs of informed consent in healthcare); Avery Wiener Katz, Is Electronic Contracting
Different? Contract Law in the Information Age 1 (2005) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.columbia.edu/
~ak472/papers/Electronic%20Contracting.pdf (arguing that standardization and search in electronic contexts
can reduce information costs).
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This leads to a counterintuitive payoff. If standardized deals lower
information costs, customized deals may raise them. I argue that customized
deals that economic theory has long considered efficient instead increase
information costs for third parties and thus can be suboptimal across the run of
mass-market contracts. This may explain why firms will not negotiate with
consumers for idiosyncratic but otherwise efficient contract terms. (Imagine
negotiating over the counter at Best Buy, even for terms for which you are
willing to pay more than the cost to Best Buy. Best Buy is unlikely to agree,
even though the terms are efficient between the parties.7)
A caveat: these insights apply best to mass-market, high-volume, low-value
transactions, in which the slight increase in transaction costs engendered by
information-forcing rules actually threatens a percentage of the potential
transactions. Nobody wants to dicker terms over a purchase of a cup of coffee;
everyone wants to negotiate over terms in a home-purchase agreement. In
individuated, customized contracts, the parties themselves clearly believe that
the cost in time and money of dickering terms is lower than the potential
damage caused by deviation from one or both parties’ expectations. Thus, I
confine my discussion to the mass-market context.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I discusses the traditional literature
of contractual consent, the economic literature of Coasean bargains and
incomplete contracts, and the literature of information costs. Part II illustrates
the economic cost of requiring consumers to buy too much information. It
argues that contractual consent is a transaction cost to be minimized, not a
good to be maximized. Part III shows that even when information exchange is
efficient for two contracting parties, their creation of an idiosyncratic
agreement may increase information costs for third parties. Part IV addresses
and ultimately rejects concerns that contract standardization may stifle
innovation in contract terms. Part V closes with final observations and
recommendations.
I. LITERATURE
Contract theory is an old field, and it is useful to examine what has gone
before. Liberal theory has enshrined consent at the center of the contract
7 Of course, the clerk at the counter lacks authority to make such a deal. Issues of agency and apparent
authority aside, the issue of authority merely begs the question as to why Best Buy would structure its
practices that way, if it meant turning down mutually beneficial contract terms.
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process and encourages courts to maximize consent by maximizing
information exchange.8 Economic theory has largely ignored issues of
consent, focusing instead on the Coasean bargain.9 To the limited extent that
economists have focused on consent costs, they too have encouraged courts to
maximize information exchange.10 This Article asserts that consent is costly
and that information exchange should be minimized in certain cases.
The first section below discusses liberal theories of contractual consent.
The second section discusses economic views of consent and the development
of information-forcing rules. The third section discusses the literature of
information costs, a literature that has not yet been applied to contract law.
Throughout this Part, I identify the gaps that my analysis fills in the current
literature, as well as points of departure between prior literature and the current
analysis.
A. Liberal Contract Theory
Traditional theories of contract rely on informed consent as a linchpin of
contract, whether as an expression of a contracting party’s individual
autonomy or as a building block in a reciprocal relationship that is the
foundation of the business relationship between two parties.11 Traditional
theory asserts that without meaningful informed consent, there is no contract.12
These theories express the liberal principle that a person may not be
contractually bound except by her consent.13 As such, the basic approach of
8

See Schuck, supra note 1, at 900.
See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of
Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1285 (1980) (“The parties can always bargain out from the rule, for instance by a
limited damages agreement. Thus, when transactions costs are zero, the particular damage rule selected for
reciprocal promises is irrelevant. Although the existence of transactions costs renders bargaining over damage
rules costly in practice, the feedback adjustment of the return promise markedly reduces the potentially
inefficient effects of legal rules.”); see also infra notes 25–42.
10 See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 97 (1989) (“Because the non-enforcement default potentially penalizes both
parties, it encourages both of them to include a quantity term.”).
11 See IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN CONTRACTUAL
RELATIONS 71 (1980) (setting out a theory of contract, termed “relational,” which describes contract as a
subsection of the broader ongoing relationship of the parties); see also Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of
Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 270 (1986) (“Properly understood, contract law is that part of a system of
entitlements that identifies those circumstances in which entitlements are validly transferred from person to
person by their consent.”).
12 See Barnett, supra note 11, at 270 (“Consent is the moral component that distinguishes valid from
invalid transfers of alienable rights.”).
13 See Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate Today: The Rise of Modularity and the Waning of Consent, in
BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS 189, 196 (Omri Ben-Shahar ed., 2007) [hereinafter
9
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liberal theories to contractual consent could be paraphrased as “the more the
merrier.”14
The modern discussion about consent in standardized contracts seeks to
return to a traditional, robust sense of contractual consent.15 The focus of this
debate is on ensuring that consumers have meaningfully consented to the terms
of an agreement.16 Theorists discuss and decry the application of End User
License Agreements, Terms of Use, and Terms of Service to consumers who
have not knowledgeably consented to the terms of a contract in any way.17 For
example, a consumer might be held to have consented to collection of private
information about that customer merely by virtue of having browsed a
website.18 The Terms of Use of the website, available if one were to search
hard enough, bind the consumer to part with her personal data both at that
website and wherever else she might travel on the web. Similarly, clicking “I
Accept” upon downloading software, entering a website, or turning on a
Radin, Boilerplate Today] (“The traditional picture of contract is the time-honored meeting of the minds. The
traditional picture imagines two autonomous wills coming together to express their autonomy by binding
themselves reciprocally to a bargain of exchange.”).
14 I use “liberal” here in the philosophical, not the political, sense. Liberal contract theory holds that no
person may be bound by law except by her informed consent, leading to the twin fictions of the social contract
and of consent to mass-market contracts. See Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553,
575 (1933) (“According to the classical view, the law of contract gives expression to and protects the will of
the parties, for the will is something inherently worthy of respect.”); see also Michael I. Krauss, Tort Law and
Private Ordering, 35 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 623, 625 n.9 (1991) (“The ‘Autonomy of the Will’ theory, fundamental
to the elaboration of classical liberal theories of contract, holds that humans are characterized by their
sovereign capacity to self-determine their future through free choice. Although all choice is influenced by
people and by circumstances (uninfluenced action is the result of instinct, not choice), the Autonomy of the
Will theory refuses to equate influence to duress.” (citing THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN ch. XIV (M.
Oakeshott ed., Basil Blackwell 1946) (1651))).
15 See Margaret Jane Radin, Humans, Computers, and Binding Commitment, 75 IND. L.J. 1125, 1153
(2000) (“If the world of online contract turns out to be more standardized—or more obviously standardized—
than the world of offline contract, the world of online contract will be troubling from the point of view that
holds consent requisite for binding obligation to arise.”).
16 See id. at 1160 (“Although customization is technologically possible on the Web as never before,
nevertheless machine-made contract and the global scope of electronic commerce may result in more
standardization and even less room for old-fashioned bargaining. What will happen to the liberal ideal of
requiring consent before parting with one’s entitlements?”).
17 See Margaret Jane Radin, Online Standardization and the Integration of Text and Machine, 70
FORDHAM L. REV. 1125, 1135 (2002) (“Almost every website contains a little link at the bottom of the home
page labeled ‘terms’ or something similar. If you click on these terms, you will most often see a full-blown
purported adhesion contract containing much fine print, in which the user exculpates the firm for its own
negligence, agrees to binding arbitration or litigation on its home turf under its home jurisdiction’s law, agrees
to limit damages to the price of the product, waives all warranties express and implied, and so on.”).
18 See Radin, Boilerplate Today, supra note 13, at 196 (“Consent is fictional on Web sites whose terms of
service state that just by browsing the site . . . one has agreed to whatever the terms say, now or as they may be
changed in the future.”).
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computer is deemed sufficient consent to enforce broad-reaching contracts.19
Contract theorists see these cases as a deviation from norms of contract law
rather than as its desirable next step.20
The theory advanced in this Article departs sharply from the traditional
approach to contractual consent. Instead of advocating information-forcing
rules to make sure that consumers are informed, this Article seeks to
demonstrate that informed consent is expensive, that standardization is the best
way to keep information costs low, and that consumers rationally prefer
standardized deals to idiosyncratic ones.
For high-volume, low-value transactions, each trade generates very little
social wealth. Let us return to the example of purchasing a cup of coffee.
Perhaps that exchange creates twenty-five cents worth of social wealth. Now,
imagine the time cost involved in reading even a short contract. Even if we set
opportunity costs equally low by assuming the consumer is paid the federal
minimum wage (which works out to nearly ten cents per minute), the value of
the transaction will vanish if contract doctrine compels the consumer to spend
three minutes perusing fine print. In this case, it would cost more to become
informed as to the terms of the agreement than the amount of wealth generated
by the trade itself. Thus, there is an affirmative value in not reading a
contract.21 Standardization is the best way to constrain the range of consumer
choice and reduce information costs. This Article therefore departs from the
received wisdom on both the advisability of information-forcing rules in the
mass-market context and the rules that disfavor consumer contract
standardization.

19 See id. (“Consent is fictional when almost all of us click onscreen boxes affirming that we have read
and understood things we have not read and would not understand if we did.”).
20 See Radin, supra note 15, at 1161 (“[T]he only ameliorative avenue I can see is for policymakers to
take on the task of deciding which terms it is important to draw buyers’ attention to in order to preserve their
autonomy, and which kinds of terms must be simply excluded on autonomy grounds.”).
21 Although he did so in a critique of the economic approach to law, Ian Macneil succinctly stated the
problem:

[T]he limited extent to which it is possible for people to consent to all the terms of a transaction,
even a relatively simple and very discrete one, soon forces the development of legal fictions
expanding the scope of “consent” far beyond anything remotely close to what the parties ever had
in mind.
Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and
Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854, 883–84 (1978).
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B. Boilerplate and Coasean Bargains
The economic analysis of boilerplate discusses the benefits of contract
standardization for contract drafters. It argues quite effectively that network
effects cause contract drafters to reuse contract language (in the form of
boilerplate) to save themselves drafting costs, economize on learning costs,
reuse “safe” language that has been vetted by courts, and signal to prospective
counterparties that the contract drafter does not seek an unfair advantage
through the drafting process.22
This boilerplate literature focuses primarily on why a drafter would reuse
contract language.23 The literature leaves for future development, however, the
question of why a mass-market consumer would prefer a standard deal to an
individuated one. The usual account—that standardization creates draftingcost savings that drafters will then pass on to the consumer—seems
incongruous with contracting experience. Drafters pass cost savings along
only in competitive markets. Unless there is a reason not to do so, companies
will quite rationally pocket the savings. Yet even in fields where competition
is suppressed (for example, in car component manufacturing in which there are
few buyers and high barriers to entry), with correspondingly low incentives to
pass drafting-cost savings on to buyers, buyers still prefer standard deals.24
Economic literature has not explained why consumers regularly prefer a
standardized agreement to an individuated one, even when the standard
agreement is more expensive. Where economic theory falls short, common
sense does not. Imagine choosing between a high-priced, brand-name
computer and a lower cost, customized computer. Many of us would select the
high-priced standardized deal. This Article therefore seeks to fill this gap
between theory and practice by focusing on the direct informational benefits of
contract standardization to the consumer.

22 See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 3, at 718 (“One set of benefits, which we call ‘learning benefits,’
arises when a firm adopts a contract term that has been commonly used in the past, regardless of whether other
firms will continue using it in the future. A second set of benefits, which we call ‘network benefits,’ arises
when a firm adopts a term that will be part of the firm’s contract at the same time that it is part of many other
firms’ contracts, regardless of whether it has been commonly used in the past.”).
23 Id. at 719–20 (“Potential ‘learning benefits’ of both commonly used explicit terms and default terms
include: (a) drafting efficiency; (b) reduced uncertainty over the meaning and validity of a term due to prior
judicial rulings; and (c) familiarity with a term among lawyers, other professionals, and the investment
community.”).
24 Id.
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Economic analyses to date have not focused on the costs of contractual
consent.25
In Coasean bargaining, parties attempt to bargain around
contractual default rules.26 The purpose of Coasean contract experiments is to
show that it does not matter who benefits from an initial allocation of a right.27
If Party A is initially given a resource, Party B may pay A for the right to use it
if B can put it to a better use.28 Regardless of who initially has a right, other
parties may bribe the initial owner if they have more efficient uses for the
owned resource. Coasean experiments in contract bargains seek to show that
initial allocations of rights do not matter if the parties are able to contract
around those allocations in a cost-free manner.
The Coase Theorem recognizes that transaction costs may cause an
otherwise efficient bargain to fail.29 The cost of reaching a bargain might be
enough that an otherwise mutually beneficial trade will not take place. So the
Theorem assumes that parties will reach efficient outcomes regardless of legal
rules only when transaction costs are zero.30 To mimic this, Coasean
experiments minimize transaction costs.31 The cost of informing a contractual
counterparty of the terms, in order to secure her consent, is a transaction cost.
One assumption of Coasean contract literature is, therefore, that the cost of
securing the other party’s consent to modify the contractual default is zero.32

25 Id. at 715–16 (“[W]e present a theoretical, institutional, and empirical analysis of two independent, but
conceptually related, forces that influence the balance of standardization, customization, and innovation in
contracts: learning externalities and network externalities.”).
26 See Stewart Schwab, A Coasean Experiment on Contract Presumptions, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 237, 242
(1988) (“[T]he Coase Theorem asserts that a change in contract presumption affects neither the efficiency of
contracts nor the distribution of wealth between the parties.”).
27 Id. (“Probably the most common formulation of the Coase Theorem asserts that, absent transaction
costs, interacting parties will reach an efficient outcome even if the law awards initial legal entitlements to less
valued uses.”).
28 Id. at 238 (“The Coase Theorem predicts that, absent transaction costs, the entitlement holder will use
the entitlement only if he is the efficient user. If not, the Coase Theorem predicts, he will make himself better
off by trading the entitlement (for a price) to someone who values it more highly.”).
29 See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960) (“These operations are often
extremely costly, sufficiently costly at any rate to prevent many transactions that would be carried out in a
world in which the pricing system worked without cost.”).
30 See id. (“The argument has proceeded up to this point on the assumption . . . that there were no costs
involved in carrying out market transactions.”).
31 See id. at 16 (“It is clear that an alternative form of economic organization which could achieve the
same result at less cost than would be incurred by using the market would enable the value of production to be
raised.”).
32 See Donald H. Regan, The Problem of Social Cost Revisited, 15 J.L. & ECON. 427, 427 (1972) (“The
proposition is: That in a world of perfect competition, perfect information, and zero transaction costs, the
allocation of resources in the economy will be efficient . . . .”).
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The Coasean experiments to date have treated contractual consent as costless
to obtain.33
For example, suppose participants play a game in which they assume the
roles of Employer and Employee.34 In the game, Employer and Employee
attempt to bargain over a clause determining the conditions under which
Employee can be fired.35 In one theoretical state, the law allocates the
employment right to Employee, in the form of a “for-cause” termination rule.
In the other theoretical state, the law allocates the employment right to
Employer, under an “at-will” employment rule. The question that the Coasean
experimenter seeks to answer is whether the parties will bargain around the
default rule (that is, bargain for “for-cause” termination in an “at-will” state, or
for “at-will” employment in a “for-cause” state) if it is efficient to do so.
If consent is otherwise costless to obtain, the parties will reach an efficient
contract whether the state law presumption favors at-will employment or forcause termination.36 If consent is costly to obtain, inefficient outcomes will
occur. Because the focus of the experiment is whether the parties will bargain
around defaults, the structure of the game makes consent functionally costless.
There is a sunk cost effect. By the time the experiment begins, the participants
have already incurred the cost of bargaining. For example, students at
Stanford took part in the experiment above as part of class participation.37
Students had to attend the class anyway and had to spend time bargaining
regardless of the outcome. Their time was already wasted. These costs were
sunk costs and did not deter them from bargaining.38 In fact, beyond initial
sessions, experiment participants were often penalized for not reaching an

33

See supra note 30.
See Schwab, supra note 26, at 240 (“A nonunionized, competitive labor market nicely illustrates a
contract presumption’s theoretical inability to influence the distribution of wealth.”).
35 See id. at 246 (discussing experimental design).
36 See id. at 254 (“In sum, the data are consistent with the reformulated Coasean hypothesis that the legal
rule does not affect whether the parties reach an efficient result.”).
37 See id. at 246 (“As part of my regular law school labor law classes and David Lipsky’s industrial and
labor relations (ILR) classes on collective bargaining theory, 222 students were paired and asked to bargain
over a collective bargaining contract. . . . Students were given a regularly scheduled class period for their
initial bargaining session, and about half the students completed negotiations and signed their contract in this
period.”).
38 See RICHARD A. POSNER, The Nature of Economic Reasoning, in ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 7–8
(4th ed. 1992) (“‘Sunk’ (incurred) costs do not affect decisions on price and quantity . . . . This discussion of
sunk costs should help explain the emphasis that economists place on the ex ante (before the fact) rather than
ex post (after the fact) perspective. Rational people base their decisions on their expectations of the future
rather than on their regrets about the past. They treat bygones as bygones.”).
34
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agreement.39 Thus, the “null alternative”—in which the costs of bargaining
were greater than the gains of bargaining—was off the table. The very form of
the Coasean experiment selects against those whose time is more valuable than
the per-hour opportunity cost of the experiment.
Study participants in experiments are therefore willing to spend time
dickering terms that many of us would not be willing to spend. From the
Coasean bargain perspective, this is good. The participants will act as though
contracting were costless. This is a simple way of simulating the zerotransaction-cost assumption of the Coase Theorem. But for the purposes of
this Article, those experiments avoid the most important part of contracting:
the costs of reaching a deal.
For “real world” contracting parties, the time spent reading or dickering
contract terms is a marginal cost, not a sunk cost.40 Real world contracting
parties are not being paid to dicker terms to contract agreements. Nor have
they already suffered the cost of time such that they might as well read the
contract. If I do not read the contract, I save time. Or conversely, if I must
spend a lot of time learning the fine details of an agreement, I may decide not
to make the deal at all. That is precisely the point of departure between this
Article and its predecessors. This Article treats consent as costly to obtain and
asks whether a consumer will enter a transaction at all, given the information
costs of doing so.41
39 See Schwab, supra note 26, at 247 (“[E]ach side would lose ten points for every hour the contract
signing was delayed . . . .”).
40 See Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of
the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 700 (1975) (“Marginal cost is the increment to total cost that results
from producing an additional increment of output. It is a function solely of variable costs, because fixed costs,
by definition, are costs unaffected by changes in output.”).
41 Notably, a pre-Coasean contract theorist, Karl Llewellyn, came closest to articulating a cost theory of
consent. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 370–71 (1960). His
approach was to differentiate between specific consent to dickered terms, and “blanket assent” to reasonable
additional terms. Llewellyn’s approach generates many of the same benefits of the cost theory set forth in this
Article—notably, the common-sense intuition that consumers do not (and probably should not) read massmarket contracts. This Article recognizes an intellectual debt to Llewellyn’s formulation. However, there are
serious differences in the approaches. First, Llewellyn did not provide any theory of consent as a cost. Rather,
he merely recognized that informed consent to all of the terms of a mass-market contract was an implausible
standard and that courts ought not to use that standard to determine whether a consumer consented. More
importantly, Llewellyn did not compare the cost of any given consent (whether “dickered” or “blanket”) with
the damage from any surprise caused by deviation from the consumer’s expectations. The approach suggested
by this Article does not differentiate between “dickered” or “default” terms but uses a single, unitary standard:
where the cost of informed consent to a given term exceeds the damage caused by surprise (weighted of course
by the chance of the surprise actually occurring), courts ought to let sleeping dogs lie, rather than “fix” the
contract by using information-forcing doctrines.
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I do not mean to suggest that the Coasean literature is unaware of the
importance of transaction costs.42 To the contrary, influential economic
literature focuses on how legal rules might encourage parties to minimize
transaction costs by exchanging closely held information.43 This literature
advocates the use of information-forcing rules to encourage contracting parties
to reveal information that only one party knows.44 These theorists argue that
information-forcing rules bring the deal closer to the Coasean ideal of perfect
Under this view, encouraging parties to reveal secret
information.45
information has a positive secondary effect on the cost of contractual consent
because the party with the lower cost in obtaining the information is
encouraged to reveal it, thus lowering the costs of informed consent.46
A primary example is the academic discussion about incomplete
contracts.47 Incomplete-contract theory discusses the role of default rules and
mandatory rules in encouraging efficient contracting behavior.48 The literature
focuses on what to do when parties do not address an issue in a contract,
leaving the decision to default contract law.49 The question then becomes
whether courts should reduce costs by picking default rules that the parties
would have chosen had they negotiated or whether courts should adopt a
suboptimal default rule, termed a “penalty default,” to encourage the parties to
bargain around the default.50 Such a penalty default rule encourages (or
42 Indeed, the absence of transaction costs is central to the Coasean approach. See Schwab, supra note
26, at 238 (“The Coase Theorem predicts that, absent transaction costs, the entitlement holder will use the
entitlement only if he is the efficient user.”).
43 See generally Ayres & Gertner, supra note 10.
44 Id. at 103–04 (“When relatively informed parties strategically withhold information, courts, to promote
information revelation, should choose a default that the informed party does not want.”).
45 Id. at 103 (“But the high-damage millers may intentionally choose to withhold information that would
make their contracts more efficient. . . . To counteract this strategic behavior, courts should choose defaults
that are different from what the parties would have wanted.”).
46 Id. at 99 (arguing that “social welfare may be enhanced by forcing parties to reveal information to a
subsidized judicial system”).
47 See generally id. at 87 (arguing for contract default rules that penalize parties who conceal private
information); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules,
100 YALE L.J. 615, 616 (1990) (describing strategic incentives to profit from closely held information).
48 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 10, at 87 (“The legal rules of contracts and corporations can be
divided into two distinct classes. The larger class consists of ‘default’ rules that parties can contract around by
prior agreement, while the smaller, but important, class consists of ‘immutable’ rules that parties cannot
change by contractual agreement.”).
49 See id. at 91 (“This Article provides a theory of how courts and legislatures should set default rules.
We suggest that efficient defaults would take a variety of forms that at times would diverge from the ‘what the
parties would have contracted for’ principle.”).
50 See id. at 93 (“This Article provides a general theory of when efficiency-minded courts or legislatures
should set penalty defaults and how they should choose between tailored and untailored default rules.”).
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forces) parties to disclose closely held information in order to bargain on an
issue.51
This Article departs from the incomplete-contract literature at two points.
Penalty default rules and other information-forcing rules maximize information
exchange. This Article argues that information exchange is costly and that the
cost sum of information exchange and surprise should be minimized.
Information-exchange theorists tend to suggest permissive information-forcing
rules that cause parties to exchange information only when it is efficient to do
so.52 But, as discussed below, the penalty default approach ignores
information costs by encouraging consumers to attempt to create idiosyncratic,
customized deals.53 For example, if you absolutely must have a Beanie Baby
by Christmas, information-forcing rules encourage you to tell the shipper this
so that the shipper may charge you a higher premium.54 This higher premium
covers the shipper’s liability in the event that the Beanie Baby does not arrive
until after the holiday season and your nephew is bitterly disappointed.55 Yet
such negotiation does not occur in the mass-market context, even when it is
efficient on a deal-by-deal basis. This Article explains why this is so. Such
deals may be efficient for the drafter and consumer but may raise information
costs for all other users of standardized contracts.56
Under the influence of incomplete-contract theory, courts have adopted
rules requiring greater and greater disclosure from drafters.57 The irony is that
the greater the amount of disclosure, the more rational it is for consumers not
to read any of it. Learning about the contract terms simply takes too much
51 See id. at 92 (“Penalty defaults are designed to give at least one party to the contract an incentive to
contract around the default rule and therefore to choose affirmatively the contract provision they prefer. In
contrast to the received wisdom, penalty defaults are purposefully set at what the parties would not want—in
order to encourage the parties to reveal information to each other or to third parties (especially the courts).”).
52 See id. at 97 (“Penalty defaults, by definition, give at least one party to the contract an incentive to
contract around the default. From an efficiency perspective, penalty default rules can be justified as a way to
encourage the production of information.”).
53 See id. (“Because the non-enforcement default potentially penalizes both parties, it encourages both of
them to include a quantity term.”).
54 See id. at 102 (“Nonetheless, so long as transaction costs are not prohibitive, a miller with high
consequential damages will gain from revealing this information and contracting for greater insurance from the
carrier because the carrier is the least-cost avoider.”).
55 See id. at 101–02 (“Informing the carrier creates value because if the carrier foresees the loss, he will
be able to prevent it more efficiently. At the same time, however, revealing the information to the carrier will
undoubtedly increase the price of shipping.”).
56 See infra Part III.A.
57 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 10, at 97 (“Because the non-enforcement default potentially penalizes
both parties, it encourages both of them to include a quantity term.”).
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time compared to the benefit received. Information-cost theory therefore may
do a better job than incomplete-contract theory of explaining and predicting
consumer contracting behavior.
C. Information Costs in Property
This Article applies information-cost theory to understand standardization
in contract law. Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith first applied a model of
information costs to analyze standardization in property law.58 It is therefore
useful to briefly describe how information-cost models have been used in the
property context and to discuss why information-cost theory has not yet been
applied to the contract context. In this section, I discuss the history of
information-cost theory, its application to property law, why it has not yet been
applied to contract law, and why I think it ought to be so applied.
Property is a system of mandatory rules, not modifiable by the agreement
of the parties.59 The goal of property law is to keep transaction costs low.60 If
transaction costs are low, high-value resources will flow to high-value users.61
Property law keeps transaction costs low by limiting the number of forms that
property can take.62 Information-cost theory therefore asserts that there is a
reason to keep the number of property forms low. This is the numerus clausus
principle—Latin for “the number [of forms] is closed.”63 New forms of
property can only be created by the slow grinding of the machinery of the
common law (or legislatures) and not by private agreement.64

58 See generally Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property:
The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus];
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773 (2001).
59 Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note 58, at 1.
60 Driesen & Ghosh, supra note 2, at 68 (“The goal of reducing or eliminating transaction costs has
strongly influenced both scholarship and public policy.”).
61 See Guido Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules—A Comment, 11 J.L.
& ECON. 67, 68 (1968) (“If people are rational, bargains are costless, and there are no legal impediments to
bargains, transactions will ex hypothesis occur to the point where bargains can no longer improve the situation;
to the point, in short, of optimal resource allocation.”).
62 See Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note 58, at 8 (“The existence of unusual property rights
increases the cost of processing information about all property rights. . . . Standardization of property rights
reduces these . . . costs.”).
63 Id. at 4.
64 See id. at 69 (“By insisting that courts respect the status quo in terms of the menu of property rights,
the numerus clausus also channels legal change in property rights to the legislature. This institutional-choice
dimension, we have argued, reinforces the information-cost minimization features of the doctrine, because
legislated changes communicate information about the legal dimensions of property more effectively than
judicially mandated changes.”).

FAIRFIELD GALLEYFINAL

1416

6/2/2009 12:28:13 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58

Consider the fee simple absolute, the leasehold estate, or the other limited
forms property can take. These limitations on forms lower information costs
by constraining choice. When there are only a few forms of property to choose
from, it becomes cheaper to choose.65
This phenomenon is part of everyday life. For example, the process of
ordering at a restaurant is greatly facilitated if there is only one entrée on the
menu.66 (Of course, there is a tradeoff: frustration costs rise if some customers
do not want the chicken pot pie.) The standardization of the menu reduces
information costs. After going to the restaurant once, one does not even need a
menu to order.
Standardization in property forms reduces information costs not only for a
given person entering into a transaction, but for all third parties considering
such a transaction.67 On the other hand, idiosyncratic arrangements in property
would, if enforced by courts, raise information costs. Suppose that Party A
wants to use Party B’s bicycle on Monday mornings. A and B decide to create
a new property right—a “Monday-morning use right”—which B will sell to
A.68 This is an efficient deal for both B and A. B wants the money more than
the bicycle on Monday mornings, and A wants a bicycle on Monday mornings
without having to store it on her back porch.69
How could such a deal be inefficient? Consider the problem such an
arrangement poses for third parties. If the law countenances Monday-morning
use rights, then anyone who wants to buy the bicycle from B will have to
inquire whether the bicycle is encumbered with such a right.70 The problem
gets even worse. Anyone else who wishes to buy a bicycle will suffer
information costs, in the form of the question: “Is the bicycle that I want to buy
65 See id. at 33 (“When it comes to the basic legal dimensions of property, limiting the number of forms
thus makes the determination of their nature less costly.”).
66 Id.
67 See id. (“Limiting the number of basic property forms allows a market participant or a potential
violator to limit his or her inquiry to whether the interest does or does not have the features of the forms on the
menu. Fancies not on the closed list need not be considered because they will not be enforced.”).
68 See id. at 27 (“But suppose A wants to create a ‘time-share’ in the watch, which would allow B to use
the watch on Mondays but only on Mondays (with A retaining for now the rights to the watch on all other
days).”).
69 See id. (“As a matter of contract law, A and B are perfectly free to enter into such an idiosyncratic
agreement. But A and B are not permitted by the law of personal property to create a property right in the use
of the watch on Mondays only and to transfer this property right from A to B.”).
70 See id. (“But consider what will happen now when any of the other ninety-nine watch owners try to
sell their watches. Given the awareness that someone has created a Monday-only right, anyone else buying a
watch must now also investigate whether any particular watch does not include Monday rights.”).
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burdened with an idiosyncratic Monday-morning use right?”71 If courts allow
any form of customized property (perhaps by adding Tuesday-evening use
rights to the mix), the value of having standardized property forms rapidly
decreases.72
The cost of the idiosyncratic deal is not borne by the original parties to the
deal, both of whom know that the bike is subject to a Monday-morning use
right. The cost is borne by every third party that enters the market for a
bicycle. The increased information cost is a straightforward externality. But if
property law limits property forms—to the fee simple, for example—then
third-party prospective purchasers know what sticks in the bundle come along
with a purchase without needing to conduct an expensive inquiry.73
Until now, contract law has been excluded from information-cost analysis.
Contract law has traditionally been seen as the antithesis of property.74 The
flexibility of the contractual form often results in high information costs and
low frustration costs.75 The low frustration costs occur because customized
contracts can be used to craft any deal that the parties desire.76 The high
information costs happen because a high level of customization does not
permit parties to any given individualized contract to know anything about the
terms of any other contract. Information-cost theorists have thus far defined
contract law through individuated, customized, negotiated agreements, rather
than standardized deals.77 Consider employment contracts. My employer and
I can negotiate for any salary we agree upon. Thus, our frustration costs are

71 See id. at 32 (“Those considering whether to purchase property rights in [given objects] will have more
to investigate: They will have to assure themselves that they are getting all the days of the week that they want.
Furthermore, they will have to worry about dimensions of division and elaboration that perhaps no one has yet
thought of, making the acquisition of any [object] more uncertain as well as riskier.”).
72 See id. at 26–27 (“The need for standardization in property law stems from an externality involving
measurement costs: Parties who create new property rights will not take into account the full magnitude of the
measurement costs they impose on strangers to the title.”).
73 See id. Suppose that property forms were not standardized. Title searches would take more time and
become more expensive because every prior idiosyncrasy must be excluded by the searching party.
74 See id. at 3 (“[P]arties to a contract are free to be as whimsical or fanciful as they like . . . . [T]he law
will enforce as property only those interests that conform to a limited number of standard forms.”).
75 See id. at 55 (“[C]ontract rights themselves can be tailored just as a house can be custom-built, but the
way of owning it is highly simplified to reduce information costs to third parties.”).
76 See id.
77 See id. at 3 (“A central difference between contract and property concerns the freedom to ‘customize’
legally enforceable interests. The law of contract recognizes no inherent limitations on the nature or the
duration of the interests that can be the subject of a legally binding contract . . . . Generally speaking, the law
will enforce as property only those interests that conform to a limited number of standard forms.”).
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low. But I cannot determine the salaries of my colleagues based on my own
salary term. Thus, my information costs are high.
By contrast, the hallmark of property systems is high standardization,
resulting in low information costs and high frustration costs.78 The cost of a
highly standardized property system is that parties will not be able to achieve
the deals they want, resulting in frustration.79 For example, until state
legislatures adopted the condominium form of property, courts refused to
accept that innovation.80 This frustrated buyers and sellers.
The rationale usually offered for strongly separating contract from property
law is that property law binds the world.81 Contract law does not, due to the
constraints of privity.82 Idiosyncratic forms of property raise information costs
for transactions in property because property law binds third parties.83 A
putative Monday-morning use right complicates transactions for everyone
because everyone is bound by property rules.84 If a purchaser buys a bicycle
that was previously encumbered by a Monday-morning right, she is bound by
that right.
Property theorists note that property rights are in rem—actionable against
the object owned—rather than in personam—against another person.85
Because property rights are in rem, they bind successors in interest.86
Customized property rights therefore create a potential minefield for
subsequent purchasers.87 Property theorists distinguish between contract and
78

See id. at 38–42 (discussing the interaction between frustration costs and property rights).
See id. (discussing the economically optimal standardization of property forms as a function of
frustration costs and information costs).
80 See id. at 15–16 (“In theory, it might be possible to create a condominium by clever combination of
preexisting property forms. But in practice, condominiums did not emerge until the 1960s, when virtually all
states adopted statutes expressly authorizing the creation of condominiums. Thus, the story of the emergence
of the condominium is also broadly consistent with the numerus clausus in that this new form of property was
the product of legislative change, rather than private contract or judicial innovation.”).
81 See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The Numerus
Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 373, 374 (2002) (“Property rights differ
from contract rights by being ‘good against all the world.’”).
82 Id.
83 See Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note 58, at 32 (“[B]ecause property rights are in rem, all
those who might violate property rights, accidentally or not, must know what they are supposed to respect. An
indefinite set of types of rights will raise the cost of preventing violations through investigation of rights.”).
84 See id.
85 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 81, at 409 (“Under their view, the distinguishing feature of a
property right is that it is an in rem right . . . .”).
86 See id. at 409–10.
87 Id.
79

FAIRFIELD GALLEYFINAL

2009]

6/2/2009 12:28:13 PM

THE COST OF CONSENT

1419

property on this ground.88 Once a right has been separated out from the
property bundle of sticks, how are subsequent parties to know?89 The fact that
property rights run against successors in interest divides property law from
contract law in current theory.90
Unlike property rights, contracts are limited by privity.91 Under the
traditional approach, it would be fine for A and B to contract for B to use A’s
bicycle on Monday mornings, because contract rights run only between A and
B. The contract right will not be enforceable against any subsequent purchaser
of the bicycle.92 The bicycle will be free to pass unencumbered in the stream
of commerce regardless of the contractual agreement between A and B.
But what if one wanted to draft contracts that lowered information costs at
the expense of some frustration? This is not hard to imagine. Such contracts
would be one-size-fits-all. They would constrain choice and would disfavor
individualized negotiation in favor of a single contract form. Of course, such
contracts exist as our everyday standardized mass-market contracts.
This Article departs from the literature by arguing that standardized
contracts are like property in that the value of standardized contracts is that
they lower information costs. Standardization creates benefits and customized
contract terms create costs for third parties to contracts, regardless of privity.
The idiosyncratic terms in one contract can raise information costs for all other
contracting parties.
An example may help demonstrate how this happens. The standard term in
a sales contract is that merchants do not disclaim damages for personal
injury.93 Now suppose two parties create an idiosyncratic waiver of personal
88 Id. at 378 (“[T]he attribute that distinguishes a property right from a contract right is that a property
right is enforceable, not just against the original grantor of the right, but also against other persons to
whom . . . rights in the asset . . . are . . . transferred.”).
89 Id. at 398 (“Accommodating verification rules comes at a price. Permitting two or more strangers to
establish and maintain, with ease, complicated and highly individualized relationships concerning use of a
common asset is costly.”).
90 Id. at 379.
91 Id.
92 See Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note 58, at 27 (“But suppose A wants to create a ‘timeshare’ in the watch, which would allow B to use the watch on Mondays but only on Mondays (with A retaining
for now the rights to the watch on all other days). As a matter of contract law, A and B are perfectly free to
enter into such an idiosyncratic agreement.”).
93 See U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (2002) (“Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the
limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the
case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable . . . .”).
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harm resulting from a negligently constructed microwave. Assume the courts
enforce this waiver. If such an idiosyncratic waiver were permitted, all
subsequent transacting parties who wanted the “standard” deal would suffer
increased costs because they would have to ensure that the idiosyncratic term
was not part of their proposed agreement. This effect jumps the privity
barrier.94 It does not depend on the original agreement binding anyone else.
Rather, information costs for everyone who wants a microwave will rise if the
idiosyncratic contract term appears in any agreement.
Property theory fails to convincingly exclude contract law from
information-cost analysis. Standardized contracts reduce information costs just
like standardized property forms do.95 Likewise, idiosyncratic contracts raise
information costs just like idiosyncratic property forms do.96 This does not
depend on whether the rights created by the contract “run with” the product or
not.
Suppose that you purchase a bicycle. If you wanted a bicycle that was
unencumbered by Monday-morning use rights, you would incur search costs to
determine whether the bicycle you were about to purchase was subject to any
such rights. But that problem can be caused by either an idiosyncratic property
right or by an idiosyncratic contract right. The problem is that customized
deals raise information costs for all parties who desire to rely on a standardized
transaction. If all bicycle sales contracts have standardized terms, then you can
buy a bicycle without studying the contract. But if courts begin to enforce
idiosyncratic and customized terms, you must incur search costs to ensure that
you get what you want.
Rather than exclude contract law from information-cost analysis, I propose
that information costs lie at the center of the distinction between dickered and
standardized contracts. The work of applying information-cost theory to
contract has only barely begun. I am aware of only two articles that apply a
“property model” of information costs to contract law.97 In a prior article, I
94 It is worth noting that the “hard property” account relies on a strong view of privity of contract not
supported in the contract literature of the latter half of the twentieth century. The property account only works
if privity prevents the costs of idiosyncratic agreements from spilling over in contracts cases, while the in rem
effect of property causes spillover in property cases. I do not think the strong version of privity assumed by
the property theorists still exists. See, e.g., Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (1931) (Cardozo,
J.) (“[T]he assault upon the citadel of privity is proceeding in these days apace.”).
95 See infra Part III.
96 See infra Part III.
97 See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, The Search Interest in Contract, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1237 (2007); Henry E.
Smith, Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and Information Flow, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1175 (2006).
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called for the use of a property model of contract to understand why consumers
search for the deals they want, rather than negotiating for them.98 In another
article, Henry Smith provided a property-based account of standardized
contract terms.99 Smith viewed boilerplate as a middle ground between the
“corner solutions” of property and contract—property being the bailiwick of
strong standardization, and contract the bailiwick of strong customization.100
Smith then discussed how contract boilerplate can use “modularity,” or the
intentional limitation of interaction between different terms in a contract, to
increase information flow and decrease transaction costs.101 This is indeed an
important insight: I have elsewhere written that modularity is an important
method of lowering the costs of searching for the right contractual deal, as part
of a process of search optimization.102
I share with Smith the intuition that property information-cost theory can
be profitably extended to contract analysis. But there the two analyses diverge.
This Article treats information costs as central to contract theory, rather than as
a middle ground between property and contract. Unlike Smith, I do not place
contract at one pole, and property at the other pole.103 Rather, both contract
and property law reduce information costs at the expense of some frustration
when they are standardized; and benefit from flexibility at the expense of
higher information costs when they are individualized.104
In sum, this Article fills several longstanding gaps in the literature. Both
traditional and economic contract theory encourage courts to maximize consent
through use of information-forcing rules. I challenge this presumption below
by showing that consent is costly, and encourage courts to minimize the cost
sum of contractual consent and consumer surprise.105 Moreover, traditional
contract literature has generally mulcted standardized contracts for raising
information costs. I argue instead that standardization reduces information

98

Fairfield, supra note 97, at 1290.
Smith, supra note 97, at 1179.
100 See id. at 1176 (arguing that boilerplate language in contracts is in the middle of the spectrum running
from contract rights to property rights).
101 See id. at 1176–77 (explaining how boilerplate takes advantage of modularity and the resulting
benefits).
102 See Fairfield, supra note 97, at 1278–81 (describing search optimization and how it makes searching
faster).
103 See Smith, supra note 97, at 1222 (“And boilerplate is interesting and revealing because it is perched
somewhere between the poles of contract and property.”).
104 See infra Part III.
105 See infra Part III.
99
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costs.106 Finally, where information-cost theorists have limited the application
of information-cost theory to property law, I argue that information-cost theory
is central to contract law, and indeed that standardized contracts cannot be
understood without analyzing information costs.
II. THE COST OF CONSENT
This Part discusses the economic effect of forcing consumers to buy too
much information. Courts often view their role in contract cases as that of
maximizing information exchange.107 I suggest here that courts instead ought
to minimize the cost sum of information and surprise. In tort law, economic
theory has long advocated minimizing the sum of precautions and accidents.108
I draw from tort theory to argue that courts should similarly minimize the cost
sum of disclosures and surprise in contracts. First, I show the cost of
disclosures. Second, I propose to reduce that cost by minimizing the cost sum
of disclosures and surprise. The subsequent sections discuss how courts can
achieve this minimization by encouraging standardization in mass-market
contracts.

106

See infra Part III.
See Gatton v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 344, 363 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (“[T]he contract
readily comported with the ‘unfair surprise element’ of procedural unconscionability, i.e., supposedly agreedupon terms that are hidden in a prolix printed form and never brought to the attention of the weaker party.”);
Parish v. Jumpking, Inc., 719 N.W.2d 540, 545 (Iowa 2006) (“Under the Restatement, a product ‘is defective
because of inadequate instructions or warnings when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could
have been reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings . . . .’” (citing
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(c) (1998))); C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut.
Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 176 (Iowa 1975) (demonstrating that a term is likely unconscionable “if the
adhering party never had an opportunity to read the term, or if it is illegible or otherwise hidden from view”
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 237 cmt. f (Tentative Draft Nos. 1–7, 1973))); Germantown
Mfg. Co. v. Rawlinson, 491 A.2d 138, 146 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (“An unexpected clause often appears in the
boilerplate of a printed form and, if read at all, is often not understood. By signing such a form, a party is
bound only to those terms which such party would reasonably expect such a printed form to contain.”); Hadley
v. Baxendale, (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (Exch. Div.) (“Now, if the special circumstances under which the
contract was actually made were communicated by the plaintiffs to the defendants, and thus known to both
parties, the damages resulting from the breach of such a contract, which they would reasonably contemplate,
would be the amount of injury which would ordinarily follow from a breach of contract under these special
circumstances so known and communicated.”); see also Schmitz, supra note 4, at 103 (“This article invites
courts to resist these formalist trends and . . . require parties to disclose material facts during pre-contractual
negotiations . . . . Similarly, risk disclosure may be proper in other one-sided relationships . . . .”).
108 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J.) (“[T]he owner’s
duty, as in other similar situations, to provide against resulting injuries is a function of three variables: (1) The
probability that she will break away; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury, if she does; (3) the burden of
adequate precautions.”).
107
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A. Limits and Definitions
As I present this approach, I acknowledge its limits. Liberal contract
theory may tell us that consent based on full disclosure is so important to us as
human beings that we must have it, regardless of cost.109 Nothing I say here
contradicts that. Society may value contractual consent for other reasons—to
bind citizens together as a community or strengthen individuals’ sense of
autonomy.110 If the goal of our society is indeed to foster expressions of free
will or the development of rich relationships through the legal system, then
perhaps robust contractual consent is something for which we are willing to
pay a lot.111 Subsidizing consent is no odder than subsidizing farms. But we
should do so with eyes open to the costs that such a choice incurs. A theory of
the cost of consent is useful, even necessary, to those who believe consent is
indispensable, because at the very least the cost of a thing is a good
demonstration of its value.112
For purposes of this discussion, I take liberal contract theory at face value.
I define consent as informed agreement.113 Consent requires information,
because a party cannot, under liberal theory, consent to a term of which she is
unaware.114 Thus, the cost of consent I speak of here is the cost of conveying
enough information to a mass-market contracting party to ensure that she is
aware of and understands the terms. This is how both liberal and economic
theory encourage information exchange: if the information is communicated,
the counterparty is bound.115 Legal enforceability is the reward given for
securing consent by communicating information.116
109 See Hall, supra note 6, at 572 (“The relativist version . . . is that the more patient understanding and
participation the better, regardless of the costs to other values entailed in achieving greater autonomy. The
absolutist position is even stronger: no valid consent is obtained unless understanding is perfect.”).
110 See Barnett, supra note 11, at 297–300 (arguing that voluntary consent is the centerpiece of a workable
theory of individual entitlements).
111 See MACNEIL, supra note 11, at 4 (“By contract I mean no more and no less than the relations among
parties to the process of projecting exchange into the future. . . . This, or rather the relations between people
when this occurs, is what I mean by contract.”).
112 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE NATURE OF ECONOMIC REASONING (1998), reprinted in LAW AND
ECONOMICS ANTHOLOGY 4 (Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Thomas S. Ulen eds., 2002) (“Cost to the economist
is ‘opportunity cost’—the benefit forgone by employing a resource in a way that denies its use to someone
else.”).
113 See Schuck, supra note 1, at 900 (“To say that one cannot be bound by a promise that one did not
voluntarily and knowingly make is to say that the individual should be the author of her own
undertakings . . . .”).
114 Id.
115 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 10, at 127 (“We have shown that when one party to a contract knows
more than another, the knowledgeable party may strategically decide not to contract around even an inefficient
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I do not suggest that contract law ought to dispose of consent entirely. But
it is worth unpacking the two major roles that consent plays within contracting
practice.117 The first role is consent to be bound.118 The second role of
consent is informed consent to the terms of an agreement.119 I do not propose
to eliminate the former. Consent to be bound by an agreement must still be
surrounded by all the pomp and circumstance of contract law to inform parties
that they are about to enter into binding legal relations.120 Without a robust
concept of consent to be bound, courts would not know to whom they should
apply a given contract.121 But that is quite different from the rules regarding
knowledge of the terms of an agreement. The jurisprudence of information
forcing and unconscionability has created an impenetrable thicket of law in
which courts routinely tell corporations what terms ought to be included, in
what type-set, and in what order.122 Still, even when corporations do what they
are told, the courts are often still unsatisfied, and again inform the corporation

default. Because the process of contracting around a default can reveal information, the knowledgeable party
may purposefully withhold information to get a larger piece of the smaller contractual pie. This possibility of
strategic incompleteness leads us to embrace more diverse forms of default rules.”).
116 Id.
117 See Stephen E. Friedman, Improving the Rolling Contract, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2006) (“The
proposal, which I refer to as ‘Template Notice,’ is an intermediate form of disclosure that meets the pressing
concerns of both buyers and sellers. It would not require sellers to provide the full text of all contract terms
before or during purchase or order. It would, however, require sellers to do more than merely give notice that
unspecified additional terms will be forthcoming.”).
118 See id. at 3 (describing how an overall template would allow the transaction to proceed without cutting
off further discussion of all the terms).
119 See id. (suggesting that deferring the terms will make “assent . . . more meaningful”).
120 See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 800–02 (1941) (describing
“cautionary” and “channeling” functions of legal formalities, which serve to inform parties that they are about
to undertake binding legal relations).
121 See Barnett, supra note 11, at 302 (“In contract law, this informational or ‘boundary defining’
requirement means that an assent to alienate rights must be manifested in some manner by one party to the
other to serve as a criterion of enforcement. . . . Without such communication, parties to a transaction (and
third parties) cannot accurately ascertain what constitutes rightful conduct and what constitutes a commitment
on which they can rely.”).
122 See Fairfield, supra note 97, at 1273 (“Courts often hold standardized contracts to a different standard
because they deem that consumers have not consented to the deal.”); see also Decker v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 1
Pa. D. & C.5th 147, 153 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 2007) (involving an insurance coverage document with “headings in
larger, bold-face type, with a bulleted, single-spaced list”); Raper v. Oliver House, LLC, 637 S.E.2d 551, 552
(N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (“[A]greement to arbitrate is prominently located on the last page of the contract in bold
face type, directly above plaintiff’s signature.”); Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 534 N.E.2d 824, 829
(N.Y. 1988) (“[T]he location and the size of print may, in a proper case, be factors bearing on procedural
unconscionability . . . .”).

FAIRFIELD GALLEYFINAL

2009]

6/2/2009 12:28:13 PM

THE COST OF CONSENT

1425

that a different term must be bolded in a different place.123 These attempts to
get information to consumers who reasonably do not want it are misplaced.
I define “contractual surprise” as the chance that a customer will be
surprised by a strange contract term, or, conversely, unsurprised by a standard
term.124 Either the consumer is ignorant of something she should know, or is
told something she already knows. If a buyer does not read the contract, there
is a chance that the contract may contain a surprising non-standard term. Of
course, if she does read the contract, she runs the risk of having wasted her
time if the deal is the standard one.
One example of contractual surprise might be a prospective buyer of an
airplane who is surprised to learn that features of the aircraft described in a
product brochure are disclaimed in the contract for sale.125 Or, software
purchasers are often surprised at the disclaimer of functionality in the software
license contract.126 In high-value transactions, preventing contractual surprise
may be worth the cost.127 But if the term is standardized, and the customer
already knows it, the benefit of forcing the exchange of the information is nil.
B. Transaction Costs and Consent
In determining the optimal standardization of contracts, I treat informed
consent as a transaction cost. Here, I ask whether the cost of obtaining a
party’s consent to terms in a mass-market transaction is worth the trouble.

123 Compare Net Global Mktg., Inc. v. Dialtone, Inc., 217 F. App’x 598, 600–02 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding
agreement unconscionable when the document was twelve pages long and contract term was not given its own
clear heading), with Boghos v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, 115 P.3d 68, 74 (Cal. 2005)
(finding arbitration clause enforceable when provision was the only text bolded).
124 See, e.g., A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 122 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (“‘Surprise’
involves the extent to which the supposedly agreed-upon terms of the bargain are hidden in a prolix printed
form drafted by the party seeking to enforce the disputed terms.”).
125 See Betaco, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 103 F.3d 1281, 1282–83 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that the
purchase agreement was fully integrated, and therefore, a contractual disclaimer effectively negated warranty
statements made in aircraft product brochure).
126 See, e.g., M. Block & Sons, Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 04-C-340, 2004 WL 1557631, at *8–
*9 (N.D. Ill. July 8, 2004) (holding that the disclaimer was conspicuous, and therefore, enforceable).
127 See Fairfield, supra note 97, at 1260 (“Parties tend to negotiate capital purchases such as equipment or
real estate development: no amount of search can create the precise deal that the buyer desires, so some degree
of customization must occur.”).
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In the familiar tort formulation, courts and theorists minimize the cost sum
of precautions and accidents.128 Precautions are good things. But the strength
of economic analysis lies in telling us when there has been too much of a good
thing. In torts, for example, economic analysis can tell us that a given
precaution could both save lives and be too expensive.129
By analogy, courts should minimize costs when the sum of costs is the cost
of informed consent to a given contractual term plus the cost created by
surprise (for example, an accident caused by not reading some disclosure about
a product). First, the burden of an additional contractual disclosure is the sum
of reading and writing costs. It costs sellers to draft, print, and draw attention
to terms, and it costs consumers to read those additional terms. When the cost
of getting informed consent is greater than the benefit of preventing surprise,
then courts ought not to use information-forcing rules to force informed
consent.
In a nod to the famous tort formulation, courts should not use coercive
information-forcing rules when the burden (B) of the additional disclosure
outweighs the chance of the information being relevant (P) times the damage
caused by letting the consumer live in ignorance (L), or when B > PL. In other
words, when a contractual disclosure is more expensive in terms of time or
money than letting a consumer be surprised by the content of the contract,
courts should let the consumer be surprised. Further, note that PL is likely to
be quite low if the term is standardized, because the consumer is likely aware
of the term and thus is not surprised in any event.
An example may be helpful. Suppose a customer, with one dollar in her
pocket, wishes to buy a cup of hot coffee from a fast-food chain. The cost of
the coffee is fifty cents. However, suppose courts require the corporation to
convey information to the consumer (on pain of liability) in the form of a
128 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J.) (“Possibly it
serves to bring this notion into relief to state it in algebraic terms: if the probability be called P; the injury, L;
and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B < PL.”).
129 There is an argument that lives are infinitely valuable, and thus cost–benefit analyses are useless when
lives are at stake. When risks are aggregated across millions of people, precautions appear to directly save a
certain number of lives. And if lives are infinitely valuable, then any precaution must be efficient. But this
does not appear to be so. A better way of discussing the question is to note that people take non-zero risks
with their lives all the time, and express measurable willingness to pay to avoid some risks, while they appear
willing to bear other risks. If lives were truly infinitely valuable, I would never drive a car again. If lives were
not very valuable, I would drive a car with little protection. Because I drive a car with a high crash-test rating,
the truth seems to be somewhere in between. I am willing to pay for enough precautions to avoid some risks,
but not to eliminate all risk.
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contractual disclosure written on the cup indicating that the coffee is “VERY
HOT!!!” The disclosure incurs printing costs of an additional five cents per
cup, which are borne by the consumer. This is not improbable, because an
information-forcing requirement is likely to result in all coffee-sellers raising
their costs, thus leaving little room for a customer to avoid the additional cost
by going to a competitor.
There are three efficiency effects in this instance: first, the customer may
not be able to purchase the fifty-cent danish that she prefers with her coffee
because she has now spent too much on coffee. (This is illustrated in Figure 1
in the next section.) Second, she may decide not to buy the coffee because she
is one of the few people for whom the fifty-cent coffee was the absolute
maximum she would pay. (This is shown in Figure 2 in the next section.) And
finally, there is a serious chance that she knew already that the coffee was
likely to come piping hot, and thus any cost incurred in informing her of this
fact is an absolute waste.
The next sections illustrate this approach, using an indifference curve and a
supply–demand curve. The cost of informed consent in mass-market
contracting not only affects individual decisions, but can be aggregated across
all transactions in a given market. Thus, the following section seeks to
demonstrate the cost of consent both to individual consumers and to total
social welfare.
C. Illustrating the Cost of Consent
There are two ways to show the costs of information-forcing rules to
consumers. The first involves an indifference curve.130 In this figure, we have
a budget constraint, line A, representing the money that a consumer has to split
between good G (on the X axis) and all other goods (on the Y axis). We also
have an indifference curve, curve C, that represents the utility of different
mixes of goods that the consumer might choose to buy.131 The line is curved
because people prefer a mix of goods. Most people prefer a glass of milk and a
cookie to two glasses of milk or two cookies.132 And it would take a lot of
milk to make up for having no cookies at all.
130

See infra fig.1.
See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 97 (10th ed.
2006) (“Any two points on the same indifference curve . . . represent two combinations of the goods that the
consumer likes equally well.”).
132 See Adrian Vermeule, The Cycles of Statutory Interpretation, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 149, 181 (2001)
(“Most people prefer to have three cookies and one glass of milk than to have four cookies.”).
131
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FIGURE 1

The consumer’s preferred allocation is represented by point E, where the
indifference curve is tangent to the budget constraint. All points on C have the
same utility to the consumer, and all points to the left of C have less utility, so
E is where the consumer’s budget can buy her the most utility.
Suppose that a court employs an information-forcing rule to require a
manufacturer to sell (and the consumer to buy) the communication of more
information about good G than the consumer would desire. By forcing the
consumer to spend more money on information about good G, a court will
reduce the amount of good G that a customer can buy with her budget. This
moves the budget constraint to line A′: the new mixes of goods that the
customer can afford. The indifference curve C′ that is tangent to A′ indicates
E′, the point of greatest utility on A′. E′ is the point at which the consumer can
afford the mix of good G (with court-required information) and other goods
that maximize her utility. Although a consumer is indifferent to the mix of
goods on any given curve, she is not indifferent between curves. The shift
from budget constraint A to A′ puts her in an inferior position, point E′, which
she is forced to adopt by a court’s information-forcing rule.
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By forcing a consumer to buy more information associated with good G,
courts would cause a consumer to substitute other goods for good G and would
leave less wealth for her to buy other goods that she may want, decreasing her
overall spending power. The first effect is called the substitution effect, which
represents the fact that the consumer would have to increase her consumption
of other goods and reduce her purchases of good G from Q1 to Q2 in order to
remain indifferent to the change in price of good G. Of course, the consumer
does not have enough money to do this (that is, the consumer’s budget is A′
rather than A*, which is the budget she would need to reach E*, the tangent
point between her new budget slope and her old indifference curve), and so
there is a second effect, called the income effect. The income effect
demonstrates that as a result of the price increase of G, the consumer has less
wealth to buy all goods, G included. The resulting decrease in good G
purchases is shown by the distance from Q2 to Q3. The substitution effect and
the income effect together reflect the amount by which the consumer will
decrease her purchases of good G. And the shift from C to C′ shows that the
consumer is worse off across the board: any point on C′ is worse than any point
on C.
It is also possible to show the economic impact of information-forcing rules
using a straightforward demand curve.133 Here, the price of good G is on the Y
axis, and the quantity of good G produced is on the X axis. Supply is mapped
by an upward-sloping line, here line S, representing the cost to the supplier of
producing the marginal good.

133

See infra fig.2.
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FIGURE 2

The higher the price for a commodity, the greater the supply—thus the
positive slope to the line. Demand is mapped as a downward-sloping line, here
line D, representing the utility of consumers who purchase the goods. As long
as consumer utility is higher than seller’s cost of production, the seller will
make the good and the buyer will buy it. The slope of the demand curve is
negative because as price increases, the quantity demanded decreases.
Correspondingly, as price decreases, the quantity demanded increases. The
intersection of the supply and demand curves, point K, represents the price that
will encourage the optimal production of goods in society.
Meddling with this balance can throw things off. Suppose that a court
adopts an information-forcing rule that requires a supplier to sell, and
consumers to buy, more information about the product or service in order to
generate “informed consent,” on pain of unenforceability. This raises the costs
of the supplier, by tacking the cost of the information onto the price of good G.
The supply curve shifts to the left, indicating the increase in the cost of
production at all points. The new line, S′, intersects with D at point K′.
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Some people may be willing to pay the greater price, even though it leaves
less room in their budgets for other goods they may have wanted to buy.134
But some percentage of the population would not be willing to bear the extra
cost. They will take that money and purchase other goods, which yield less
utility to them than good G would have. Those lost trades of good G are
deadweight loss, and are indicated by the shaded triangle.
As shown by these admittedly simple graphs, information-forcing rules run
the risk of requiring consumers to purchase more information than they desire.
Courts often do this when they require additional disclosures in contracts, or
hold a contract unenforceable for failure to adequately disclose terms. This
causes consumers to suboptimally allocate their own resources, and it causes
some proportion of gainful trades to fall through. The reader might protest that
these increases in cost are not very much, because the cost of including an
additional contract term is not very great. Yet in mass-market contracts, the
surplus to be divided between buyer and seller may be very small. The
additional cost may therefore matter in enough cases to decrease overall social
welfare significantly.135
III. THE BENEFITS OF STANDARDIZATION
The prior Part demonstrated that where the cost of mandatory information
transfer outweighs its benefit, parties rationally do not—and should not—read
contracts in order to consent to terms. But some information-forcing rules are
permissive, not mandatory.136 Such rules encourage parties to reveal
idiosyncratic information about themselves when it is efficient for the
contracting parties to do so.137 This Part argues that even permissive
information-forcing rules may be inefficient overall, where the information
costs that customized deals impose on third parties outweigh the benefits of the
134

See supra fig.1.
For an examination of the cost of useless labels in commercial products, see Parish v. Jumpking, Inc.,
719 N.W.2d 540, 545–46 (Iowa 2006) (describing a myriad of separate warning labels on a trampoline).
136 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 10, at 103 (“The uninformed party, the carrier, may attempt to learn
the expected damages of the informed parties, the millers, by offering a menu of insurance contracts. The
millers might then be induced to self-select the insurance contract that is optimal for their expected damages.”
(discussing Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (Exch. Div.))).
137 See Hadley, 156 Eng. Rep. at 151 (“Now, if the special circumstances under which the contract was
actually made were communicated by the plaintiffs to the defendants, and thus known to both parties, the
damages resulting from the breach of such a contract, which they would reasonably contemplate, would be the
amount of injury which would ordinarily follow from a breach of contract under these special circumstances so
known and communicated.”).
135
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contracting parties. I further argue that consumers, who search for deals,
prefer standardized deals because standardization reduces consumer
information costs.138
I then apply these insights to several problems in contract law. Courts
often speak as though their role is to enable a broad range of contractual choice
and encourage informed consent by eliminating standard contracts.139 I
demonstrate that courts instead often act sub silentio to reduce options, limit
individualized negotiation, and thus reduce information costs. I further
demonstrate that courts use supposedly anti-standardization doctrines like
unconscionability and adhesion instead to standardize agreements within a
given industry. Courts standardize contracts by eliminating contractual
outliers: those contracts which deviate sufficiently from the norm such that
they raise information costs for all parties.
A. Contract Information Externalities
This section analyzes the effect of information-forcing regimes on third
parties. The first subsection explains how customization increases information
costs to third parties. The second subsection demonstrates how standardization
can lower information costs to third parties.
1. Customization Increases Information Costs to Third Parties
The benefits of standardization (and the concurrent costs of idiosyncratic
agreements reached by informed, negotiated consent) affect not only the
parties who negotiate the agreement, but every other party who wishes to enter
into a transaction of similar kind.140 Recall the example of the exploding
microwave.141 If the consumer does not desire to purchase insurance against a
microwave explosion, then it is efficient, as between consumer and seller, for
138 See Fairfield, supra note 97, at 1256 (“The franchise system creates information economies for
potential diners, not just production benefits for the franchisee. The same economies exist in contract: Parties
often prefer the standard deal to an idiosyncratic one.”).
139 See Ticknor v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc., 265 F.3d 931, 939–45 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding standardized
arbitration provision unenforceable because it lacked mutuality, and contained terms favoring franchisor over
franchisee); Comb v. Paypal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1172–77 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (finding standardized
contract compelling arbitration unenforceable as unconscionable because of specific content of terms
governing mutuality, venue, costs of arbitration, etc.).
140 For the value of these standard practices to industries, see Avery Katz, Taking Private Ordering
Seriously, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 1746 (1996) (evaluating whether rules established by industries are
efficient, and arguing that private ordering means more than mere absence of state regulation).
141 See supra text accompanying note 93.
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the parties to disclaim liability for personal injury in the event of negligent
manufacture. But the cost of the idiosyncratic damages waiver falls on third
parties, who now must inspect their contracts for the customized term.
The lens of information costs can help explain why courts interpret terms
consistently with standard trade or industry understandings of terms, while
often rejecting the idiosyncratic interpretations advanced by the parties before
the court. Case illustrations may help cement the point. L & A Contracting
Co. v. Southern Concrete Services, Inc. considered the impact that an
idiosyncratic definition of “default” would have on the broader industry of
surety providers.142 The court determined that the definition of “default”
proffered by L & A was impractical because it departed from the industry
meaning of the term.143 The court noted: “A definition of a contract term that
leads to impractical or commercially absurd results is unreasonable. . . .
Sureties deprived of a clear rule for notices of default would be reluctant to
enter into otherwise profitable contracts.”144 The terms of the individual
contract before the court mattered less than the impact of the term across the
construction and surety industries.
Given that parties are usually free to define their own contract terms, the
result in L & A Contracting Co. is startling. Under traditional contract theory,
that case is either an outlier or wrongly decided.145 But the lens of
information-cost theory permits us to see why the court rejected the contractual
definition of default in favor of the industry definition. The cost to other
members of the industry of no longer knowing what “default” meant would
have been greater than the benefit of the customized default term to the parties
in the case. The court prevented the costs to the industry of the private
agreement by rejecting the idiosyncratic contract term.
Courts do not always reject idiosyncratic definitions. Often they will
instead use interpretive rules that exert a gravitational pull on contract terms.
Thus, a “definition . . . must be determined in light of reasonable industry
custom and usage . . . even though words in their ordinary or legal meaning are
unambiguous.”146 Judge Learned Hand’s formulation is similarly striking: “I
142

17 F.3d 106, 110–11 (5th Cir. 1994).
Id.
144 Id.
145 See Caulkins Indiantown Citrus Co. v. Nevins Fruit Co., 831 So.2d 727, 735 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)
(“[W]here a contract is clear and unambiguous, the express contract terms may not be varied by resort to
extrinsic evidence, including that related to the UCC obligation of good faith or custom and usage.”).
146 Stender v. Twin City Foods, Inc., 510 P.2d 221, 225 (Wash. 1973).
143
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cannot see why judges should not hold men to understandings which are the
tacit presupposition on which they deal.”147 These cases are traditionally
understood as purely interpretive. Under the conventional view, industry
custom is supposed to supplement, not supplant, contractual terms.148 But
courts do more than merely resolve ambiguity by reference to custom and
practice. They actively interpret terms in ways that remove idiosyncrasies that
might raise contracting costs across the industry.149 This gravitational pull
exerts a constant pressure on contract terms to conform to the standard
understanding, and reduces the industry-wide impact of customized deals.
Consider the case of Arc & Gas Welder Associates, Inc. v. Green Fuel
Economizer Co.150 The subcontractor, Green, hired Arc to provide steel plates,
polished to a “No. 4 finish.”151 The general contract called for a polish with no
pits, cracks, or crevices.152 Green maintained that the “No. 4 finish”
contemplated in its contract with Arc required such smoothness as well.153 The
court rejected that argument, finding that standard industry practice for
polishing “means a smoothness which does not exceed 42 micro-inches,
resulting in a surface without pits,” ignoring the cracks and crevices
requirement from the contract.154 In justifying its argument, the court noted
that “the parties used terms which had a definite meaning in the industry and
may not now be heard to say that they did not use the terms as the industry
understood them.”155 Industry players are not allowed to offer their own
idiosyncratic definition of terms the industry relied upon for clarity. Instead,
the court pulls such outliers toward the industry standard, because such
idiosyncratic interpretations would increase costs for all other industry
contracts.

147

Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen v. Dexter & Carpenter, Inc., 299 F. 991, 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (Hand, J.).
See Caulkins, 831 So.2d at 733 (“Generally, where the language of a contract is ambiguous, parol
evidence is admissible to explain or clarify the intention of the parties.”).
149 See L & A Contracting Co., 17 F.3d at 111 (“Sureties deprived of a clear rule for notices of default
would be reluctant to enter into otherwise profitable contracts.”).
150 285 F.2d 863 (4th Cir. 1960).
151 Id. at 864.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 866.
154 Id. at 867.
155 Id. at 868.
148
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2. Standardization Lowers Information Costs for Third Parties
The traditional view is that standardized agreements hide terms and raise
information costs.156 But viewed through the lens of information-cost theory,
it is clear that standardized agreements reduce information costs for parties
who are searching for the set of contract terms that they desire. Suppose
peanut butter manufacturers made only one type of peanut butter. If a
customer desires to purchase peanut butter, the process is quick and easy: there
is only one kind to buy. The customer will admittedly suffer frustration costs
if she prefers extra chunky peanut butter. But her frustration costs may be less
than the benefit of having a streamlined purchasing process. Suppose instead
that the purchasing consumer now faces a store shelf stocked with peanut
butter that is chunky, extra chunky, reduced fat creamy, reduced fat super
chunky, natural creamy, crunchy, cinnamon-raisin, white chocolate, smooth,
creamy, honey-roasted, organic, unsalted, soy, mixed with jelly, “The Heat is
On” spiced, or in a squeeze bottle. Frustration costs will be low because the
consumer can purchase precisely what she wants. But this comes at a cost;
verifying the correct type of peanut butter takes extra time in the aisle. The
consumer cannot grab and go.
The peanut butter example relies on the features of a product to make a
point about standardization. It is only one step from peanut butter to contract
terms. Imagine a consumer who, instead of choosing a standard warranty,
must choose from many different individuated options. The cost of informed
choice rises for each additional permutation presented.
B. Direct Benefits of Standardization to Consumers
This explains why consumers desire standard deals. Consumers search for
deals that contain the mix of contract terms and product features that they
desire.157 They spend more time as third parties searching for a contract than
they do negotiating terms within a contract.158 That is: if Party A (a consumer)
enters into an idiosyncratic contract with Party B (a supplier), Party C (another
156 See A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 122 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (“‘Surprise’
involves the extent to which the supposedly agreed-upon terms of the bargain are hidden in a prolix printed
form drafted by the party seeking to enforce the disputed terms.”).
157 See Fairfield, supra note 97, at 1240 (“[I]nquiring buyers might go to a website to compare prices,
guarantees, and warranty terms already on offer.”).
158 See id. (“The primary cost of contracting is not in negotiating the fine details of the contract with the
store; the cost of contracting is finding a store that sells the desired product coupled with the desired
contract.”).
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consumer) suffers higher information costs. Consumers therefore rationally
respond to information costs. They care more about information externalities
that raise the costs of searching than they do about dickering terms within an
agreement. Traditional theory analyzes consumers as though they had already
entered a contract.159 But consumers do most of their work in the precontractual moment; they search for deals they desire rather than negotiate for
them.160 Consumers prefer standardized deals because they reduce the costs of
search in the pre-contractual moment.
The traditional explanation for why consumers prefer standardized
contracts, that drafting cost-savings result in lower prices, seems incomplete.
It is unclear that companies will pass the savings along rather than pocketing
the profits. Imagine a competitive market at equilibrium: the point at which no
company can unilaterally depart downward in price and make money.161 Now
suppose Company A develops a new standardized contract. Company A could
try to steal customers from competitors by using the saved drafting costs to
depart downward in price. But standardized contract language gives no
competitive advantage because it is not proprietary.162 Other companies would
copy the standardized language, and could depart downward as well. In fact,
other companies would save even more, because they did not incur the original
drafting costs or the costs of fireproofing the boilerplate in litigation.163 The
result would be reduced profits for all sellers. Thus, it is more likely that
corporations will therefore simply pocket drafting cost savings.
The drafter-centered view of standardization ignores a significant portion
of the benefits that standardization creates within modern commercial

159 See Isler v. Tex. Oil & Gas Corp., 749 F.2d 22, 23 (10th Cir. 1984) (“The very notion of contract is the
consensual formation of relationships with bargained-for duties.”).
160 See Fairfield, supra note 97, at 1240 (“[P]rospective purchasers search for counterparties that offer the
set of contract terms they desire.”).
161 See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 21 (1994) (“[N]o player could do better
by choosing a different strategy given the strategy the other chooses. The strategy of each player must be a
best response to the strategies of the other.”).
162 Although he did so in his proposal for pre-approved contract terms, Clayton Gillette summarized the
problem with non-proprietary contract terms:

Because approved contracts of necessity become publicly available after administrative
endorsement . . . and can be mimicked by competing sellers who did not contribute to the process
of obtaining approval, sellers may refrain from submitting proposals in order to free ride off the
efforts of competitors without incurring any of the commensurate costs or downside risks.
Clayton P. Gillette, Pre-Approved Contracts for Internet Commerce, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 975, 989 (2005).
163 Id.
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markets.164 While producers may benefit from standardization by reducing
production costs and benefiting from economies of scale, products benefit from
economies of demand as well. Most basically, the more people use the
standard, the more the standard becomes useful.165
Imagine a manufacturer of electric cords. It is true that standardization
does lower the manufacturing costs to the factory owner. Using the same base
template over and over again is the foundation of the Industrial Revolution.
But there is another reason that the manufacturer of electrical cords finds such
a ready market for identical cords. Consumers benefit from standardization
that goes beyond the cost-savings analysis realized by the manufacturer
through economies of scale and repetition. Standardization benefits consumers
because consumers do not need to inquire upon purchasing an item with an
electric cord whether that cord will fit the sockets in the consumer’s wall. The
customer may purchase a cord more swiftly and with less inquiry, and be more
certain of a positive result. These reduced information costs benefit the
consumer directly because the consumer spends less time shopping for the
“right” electrical cord. This is a direct savings to the consumer.
The same concept applies to contracts. Consumers save time (and thus
money) when they accept “the standard deal,” rather than learn the particulars
of a specifically negotiated contract.166 This Article argues that contracts
benefit from economies of demand in the same manner that products benefit
from economies of demand. The terms of a contract become more valuable—
and desirable—the more people know, understand, and use them because the
more people use standard terms, the less expensive contracting becomes for

164 See Fairfield, supra note 97, at 1256 (“For example, travelers on the interstate highway system may
well choose to go to a franchise restaurant not only because the restaurants routinely benefit from economies
of scale that allow them to pass along lower costs to the consumer but also because the travelers know what to
expect.”).
165 See Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note 58, at 33 n.127 (stating that standardization in
manufacturing has the twin benefits of facilitating economies of scale and of reducing transaction costs by,
inter alia, reducing the need for monitoring (citing Charles P. Kindleberger, Standards as Public, Collective
and Private Goods, 36 KYKLOS 377, 378, 384 (1983))); William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information:
Disclosure Laws and American Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701, 1741–42 (1999) (stating that
standardization carries with it many benefits, including the reduction of “data collection and processing
costs”).
166 See Fairfield, supra note 97, at 1274 (“Yet at least some theory of contract ought to be incensed when
consumers are required to read contracts. The cost of doing so is considerable, especially as a proportion of
the expected gain to be realized out of the trade. Let us say a consumer values his time at ten dollars per hour.
If a contractual relationship takes an hour to fully comprehend, a consumer faced with even a prostandardization regime will prefer not to undertake the trade if he is required to read the contract.”).
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everyone.167 The converse is also true—the more customization that parties
use in their contracts, the more expensive contracting becomes for everyone
else.
C. Courts and Standardization
Given the above analysis, contract law ought to minimize information costs
to third parties. Courts can reduce information costs to consumers by
enforcing standardized agreements.168 To do so, however, courts must evolve
beyond traditional contract theory. Current theory holds that a court’s function
is to enable choice and facilitate individualized information transfer.169 This
section argues that courts can and should abandon the rhetoric of negotiated
agreement and instead constrain individualized negotiations to preserve a
uniform standard and reduce information costs. Legal theory also seems to
mulct standardized contracts for lack of consent under the doctrines of
adhesion and unconscionability.170 This section demonstrates that courts do
not use anti-standardization doctrines to limit standardized contracts. Instead,
courts (not without irony) often use anti-standardization doctrines to eliminate
contractual outliers and promote standardization.171
167 See infra Part IV.A; see also Fairfield, supra note 97, at 1255 (“As before, if the meeting of the minds
between two parties as to idiosyncratic contract terms (or idiosyncratic interpretations of a previously settled
and standardized term) is given effect, the broader contracting community suffers higher search costs.”).
168 See C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 177 (Iowa 1975) (“[T]he burglary
‘definition’ which crept into this policy comports neither with the concept a layman might have of that crime,
nor with a legal interpretation.”).
169 See supra note 139 (discussing the prevailing theory that customers prefer standardization because it
reduces consumer information costs).
170 See Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627, 627 (2002) (“Yet
contract theorists are nothing if not suspicious of such contracts, having long ago dubbed them pejoratively
‘contracts of adhesion.’ Indeed, I would wager that a plurality of contracts teachers would favor a judicial
refusal to enforce form contracts altogether . . . .”).
171 See, e.g., Sw. Pet Prods., Inc. v. Koch Indus., Inc., 107 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1113–14 (D. Ariz. 2000)
(holding that “substantive unconscionability focuses on the terms of the contract . . . [and] it appears that the
terms were standard in the industry”); Bennett v. Behring Corp., 466 F. Supp. 689, 697 (S.D. Fla. 1979)
(explaining that “the Court must compare the price actually being paid by the complaining party, to the price
being paid by other similarly situated consumers in a similar transaction”); Reznor v. J. Artist Mgmt., Inc.,
365 F. Supp. 2d 565, 577 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (relying on the fact that “no . . . evidence that the objected-to
provisions in the . . . agreement were unusual for the industry”); Cal. Grocers Ass’n v. Bank of Am., 27 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 396, 402 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (“Bank of America’s $3 DIR fee is actually at the low end of prices
charged . . . by other financial institutions, many of which charge between $4 and $10.”); Carboni v.
Arrospide, 2 Cal. Rptr. 845, 849 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (“We have little trouble concluding that an interest rate
of 200 percent . . . is substantively unconscionable . . . . [T]he interest rate . . . was approximately ten times
the rate then prevailing in the credit market for similar loans.”); Fotomat Corp. of Fla. v. Chanda, 464 So.2d
626, 630 (Fla. App. Dist. 1985) (noting that “the limitation of liability provision was standard in the industry”
and that “[t]his is clearly a commercially reasonable consideration”); Retail Credit Corp. v. Shorterage, No.
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1. The Numerus Clausus in Contract
Contract law has not been traditionally understood as offering a limited
number of contractual forms. The traditional understanding of the role of
courts in contract cases is that they should facilitate negotiated choice.172
Freedom of contract is as close to a universal positive principle as is accepted
in contract law.173 Instead, this Article proposes that courts should and
sometimes do constrain choice and limit the range of contractual language in
the mass-market context rather than enable idiosyncratic deals that raise
information costs. Doctrines that constrain negotiated choice and limit the
range of contractual terms should govern mass-market, high-volume, lowvalue cases, while doctrines enabling individual preferences and idiosyncratic
understandings should govern low-volume, high-value, dickered cases. To
some extent courts have already adopted this division, although haphazardly
and sub silentio. This Article first explores those instances in which courts
already constrain choice and language to keep contracts standardized. In
response to these situations, this Article then proposes some changes courts
could make to further encourage standardization and limit information costs in
the mass-market context.
a. The Statute of Frauds and Parol Evidence
Commercial law constrains the range of contractual choice and
standardizes agreements by requiring contracts to be in writing.174 Once there
is a writing, courts limit evidence of negotiations between the parties that
occurred prior to or contemporaneous with the writing.175 Under the parol
evidence rule, courts therefore discard evidence of actual negotiations between
69465, 1996 WL 199831, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 25, 1996) (“[I]n determining . . . substantive
unconscionability, this court must consider the interest rates which have been held to be ‘commercially
reasonable.’” (citing Collins v. Click Camera & Video, Inc., 621 N.E.2d 1294, 1299 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993)
(noting that “courts examining whether a particular limitations clause is substantively unconscionable have
considered . . . the standard in the industry”))); M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 970 P.2d
803, 812 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (“Such clauses are standard in the software industry . . . . Indeed, they are
useful in making software affordable.”); U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (2002) (“The basic test is whether, in the light
of the general commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses
involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the making
of the contract.”).
172 See supra Part II.A.
173 See supra Part II.A.
174 U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (2002) (“[A] contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is not
enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is some writing . . . .”).
175 § 2-202 (“[A] final expression of their agreement . . . may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior
agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement . . . .”).
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the parties.176 Courts may, however, consider usage of trade to explain
contract terms.177 The effect of the parol evidence rule is that courts substitute
the general community’s understanding of the standard meanings of terms in
place of any negotiated meaning not incorporated into the writing. 178
Indeed, the parol evidence rule only excludes evidence of negotiations over
idiosyncratic terms. Suppose Party A and Party B negotiate a contract: A and B
may choose the standard shipping term, FOB Seller’s place of business; or a
different term—FOB Buyer’s place of business.179 If A and B desire the
standard term but fail to include it in the contract, the term can come in under
the trade-use exception.180 However, if A and B negotiated for an idiosyncratic
shipping rule but forgot to include that term in the contract, all evidence of
those negotiated preferences would be excluded by the court as impermissible
extrinsic evidence, because the idiosyncratic term would fall outside the scope
of standard trade use or course of dealing.181 The parol evidence rule is
therefore best understood as a rule that reduces the information costs
associated with contracting.
Information-cost theory helps explain why courts purport to enforce the
negotiated preferences of the parties, yet exclude all evidence of such
negotiations under the parol evidence rule. The parol evidence rule is not a
rule about good evidence. If courts wanted good evidence, they would not
exclude probative evidence of the actual intent of the parties in reaching an
agreement. The actual effect of the rule is to exclude evidence of a negotiating
process that would be highly likely to provide useful information about
idiosyncratic terms that the parties desired.182
176 See St. Johns N. F. Shipping Corp. v. S. A. Companhia Geral Commercial do Rio de Janeiro, 263 U.S.
119, 120 (1923) (summarizing petitioner’s argument and discussing, in a positive way, earlier cases where
“testimony was offered to modify the custom by an oral contract, and [two state supreme courts] refused to
admit such evidence on the ground of the parol evidence rule”).
177 § 2-202 (stating that contract terms “may be explained or supplemented . . . by course of performance,
course of dealing, or usage of trade”).
178 See Porto Rico Sugar Co. v. Lorenzo, 222 U.S. 481, 482 (1912) (finding that parol evidence of the
local grinding season based on industry practice properly was admitted to determine the time of performance,
which was not specified in a contract to grind sugarcane).
179 §§ 2-308, 2-319, 2-509.
180 See § 2-202 (discussing the significance of “a course of dealing” or “usage of trade” to the parol
evidence rule).
181 See id. (discussing the concept of “merger” in final contract drafting).
182 See Hotchkiss v. Nat’l City Bank of N.Y., 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (“A contract has, strictly
speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or individual, intent of the parties. A contract is an obligation
attached by the mere force of law to certain acts of the parties, usually words, which ordinarily accompany and
represent a known intent.”).
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b. Trade Use and Industry Custom and Practice
Trade use and industry standards shape judicial interpretation of contract
terms.183 Courts adopt industry standards as default rules.184 When
determining if a product is too expensive, courts compare the price to the
standard market rate.185 When measuring whether a contract term is
unconscionable, courts look to standard practice.186 When construing the
meaning of terms, courts look to how the term is defined within the industry.187
The concept of “industry” itself is important for standardization. In
contract law, each industry provides its own legal box within which it may
control and establish standards.188 This permits courts to tailor standard terms
for that industry without worrying that those terms will be applied in other
contexts. The effect of the legal concept of an industry is thus to limit
spillover. Standardized contracts must be isolated on an industry-by-industry
basis. If courts were to apply standardized terms from the shoe-selling
industry to a law professor’s employment contract, there would likely be
confusion. Within each box, courts create a gravitational pull toward a
standardized contract.
c. Standard Default Terms
Courts also standardize contracts by filling contract gaps with default terms
that operate in the absence of contractual language by the parties. These rules
are often drawn from the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), which derives
many of its default terms from industry standards.189 Prevailing economic
theory classifies default rules according to two categories: majoritarian defaults
and penalty defaults. A majoritarian default is an optimal default contract term
183 See Elizabeth Warren, Trade Usage and Parties in the Trade: An Economic Rationale for an Inflexible
Rule, 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 515 (1981) (“In commercial litigation, courts most frequently interpret contract terms
according to the usage of the trade. That is, courts will give the disputed term the meaning it carries in similar
business settings.”).
184 See infra Part III.C.1.c–d.
185 See infra Part III.C.1.c–d.
186 See infra Part III.C.1.c–d.
187 See Warren, supra note 183, at 518 (“Uniformly charging all parties in a trade with knowledge of a
trade usage benefits everyone established in the trade by reducing their transactions costs.”).
188 See In re Tolona Pizza Prods. Corp., 3 F.3d 1029, 1033 (7th Cir. 1993) (“We conclude that ‘ordinary
business terms’ refers to the range of terms that encompasses the practices in which firms similar in some
general way to the creditor in question engage, and that only dealings so idiosyncratic as to fall outside that
broad range should be deemed extraordinary and therefore outside the scope . . . .”).
189 See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(3), 1-205 (2002) (defining “agreement” to include course of dealing, usage of
trade or course of performance and defining “usage of trade,” respectively).
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chosen by the court on behalf of the parties, based on the theory that the parties
would have wanted that term if they had negotiated over the provision.190 A
penalty default is a suboptimal default contract term imposed by courts to
encourage the parties to bargain around the default.191 Notably, neither theory
explains why most contracting parties choose to use standard agreements that
must in some respect be suboptimal between them, but still refrain from
bargaining around them.
This Article proposes to construct default rules differently. A useful
default rule is neither that which the majority of parties would have used if
they had bargained, nor a rule designed to be suboptimal and force information
exchange. A good default rule instead reinforces industry standards in order to
reduce the information costs of other industry parties.192 This may closely
resemble a majoritarian default. But there remains a critical difference
between a majoritarian default and an industry standard: a standard is the rule
chosen (or not chosen) by most parties given transaction costs. The standard is
a creature of transaction costs insofar as the goal of a standard is to minimize
such costs. By comparison, a majoritarian default is the one parties would
have selected absent transaction costs.193 Or, in common-sense terms: a court
might wisely enforce standardized rules that reduce information costs, but that
do not reflect the choice that most parties would make if they were able to
bargain costlessly.
Information-cost theory explains how default rules can be suboptimal
between any given set of contracting parties, yet optimal for the industry as a
whole. Contracting parties prospectively search for contracts they may want to
enter, rather than retrospectively seeking to fine tune a deal they have already
entered.194 The information cost of simple, commonly held terms is low.195

190 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 10, at 93 (“Scholars who attribute contractual incompleteness to
transaction costs are naturally drawn toward choosing defaults that the majority of contracting parties ‘would
have wanted’ because these majoritarian defaults seem to minimize the costs of contracting.”).
191 See id. at 91 (“Penalty defaults are designed to give at least one party to the contract an incentive to
contract around the default rule and therefore to choose affirmatively the contract provision they prefer.”).
192 See id. (“An ‘untailored default,’ true to its etymology, provides the parties to all contracts with a
single, off-the-rack standard that in some sense represents what the majority of contracting parties would
want.”); see also Warren, supra note 183, at 518 (“In the long run, widespread application of the standard
benefits trade newcomers as well by causing those established in the trade to deal with them on the same terms
as others in the trade.”).
193 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 10, at 93.
194 See POSNER, supra note 112, at 5 (“Rational people base their decisions on their expectations of the
future rather than on their regrets about the past.”); see also Fairfield, supra note 97, at 1240 (“The primary
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The information cost of individuated deals is high.196 Industry parties who
repeatedly contract may want to use standard language and leave industry
standards intact even though there might be some benefit to deviating from the
industry norm and employing uniquely negotiated terms.
Supplying default terms reduces the degree to which a contract can vary
from the standard.197 For example, if a contract deviates in its price term from
the norm, its warranty provisions may still be standardized. If a contract
deviates from the norm by offering an idiosyncratic disclaimer of liability, it
may still be standardized in terms of price. Default rules offer a gravitational
pull toward the norm.
d. The Battle of the Forms
The knockout rule’s infamous gloss on U.C.C. section 2-207 is also best
understood as a doctrine designed to restrict individuated negotiation in order
to protect the informational benefits of standardized terms. The common
understanding of the knockout rule is that if parties’ terms differ, they are
knocked out, and the U.C.C. default is applied.198 However, courts will often
look to industry standards before applying the U.C.C. default to determine
whether there is a more tailored term for the particular industry.199 For
example, courts apply section 2-207 to insert specific industry standards on
warranty periods, indemnification terms, time for payment due, or arbitration
clauses.200 In these cases, party preferences are therefore replaced with
cost of contracting is not in negotiating the fine details of the contract with the store; the cost of contracting is
finding a store that sells the desired product coupled with the desired contract.”).
195 See C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 177 (Iowa 1975) (“[T]he burglary
‘definition’ which crept into this policy comports neither with the concept a layman might have of that crime,
nor with a legal interpretation.”).
196 See id. at 176 (demonstrating that a term is likely unconscionable “if the adhering party never had an
opportunity to read the term, or if it is illegible or otherwise hidden from view”).
197 See Radin, Boilerplate Today, supra note 13, at 190 (“Standardization serves customization and vice
versa. Uniformity at one level facilitates customization at another. Uniform terms serve as building blocks in
a customized document. But those uniform terms themselves may be composed of building-block clauses
arranged in a customized way.”).
198 See, e.g., Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 741 F.2d 1569, 1579 (10th Cir. 1984) (applying the
knockout rule such that the “ultimate contract . . . includes those non-conflicting terms and any other terms
supplied by the U.C.C., including terms incorporated by course of performance (§ 2-208), course of dealing
(§ 1-205), usage of trade (§ 1-205), and other ‘gap fillers’ or ‘off-the-rack’ terms”).
199 Id.
200 See Dresser Indus., Inc., Waukesha Engine Div. v. Gradall Co., 965 F.2d 1442, 1452 (7th Cir. 1992)
(stating that “the district court acted appropriately in allowing the jury to consider the parties’ course of
performance, course of dealing, and usage in the trade” because plaintiff’s warranty provision reflected
common business practice); Vulcan Auto. Equip., Ltd. v. Global Marine Engine & Parts, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d
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industry standards. This can best be understood as enforcing the standard deal
in the industry at the expense of individuated preferences: a protection of the
information costs inherent in the standard deal.
Note that consent is not a factor in these considerations: the parties have
not, and should not, read each others’ purchase orders or order confirmations.
Although the battle of the forms is most commonly a business-to-business
issue, it falls under the categorization of high-volume, non-negotiated
transactions. Businesses ordering supplies should not scrutinize order forms
with any more frequency than other purchasers of goods.
e. Limited Corporate Forms
Another example of the numerus clausus in contract law comes from
corporate law. A business may only take one of a constrained set of legal
forms. Corporations, limited liability partnerships, and other legally defined
business associations present a standardized face to the public, declaring the
extent of limited liability protection.201
Again, information-cost theory can be used to explain why the law
recognizes only the particular forms. A primary function of corporate forms is
to standardize the relationship between the corporation and the public (in terms
of limited liability) and the relationship between shareholders and
management.202 The standardization of management–shareholder relationships
is necessary to sell chunks of that relationship (in the form of stock) on
consumer stock markets.203 If we accept that efficient stock trading best serves

156, 165–66 (D.R.I. 2003) (“The Official Comment to subsection (1) explains that a reasonable time depends
upon the circumstances surrounding the contractual relationship. This Court, therefore, finds that a reasonable
time for payment in this case is sixty days.”); Titanium Metals Corp. v. Elkem Mgmt., Inc., 191 F.R.D. 468,
470 (W.D. Pa. 1998) (allowing evidence that indemnification is non-standard in smelting industry, the court
held “that usage of trade, if proven, is a valid gap-filler under UCC § 2-207(3)”); Flender Corp. v. Tippins
Int’l, Inc., 830 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (knocking out the arbitration clause as contrary to
industry practice (citing Daitom, 741 F.2d at 1579)).
201 See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J.
387, 390 (2000) (listing the various corporate forms).
202 See Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, The Contract Clause and the Corporation, 55 BROOK. L.
REV. 767, 770 (1989) (“[S]tate corporation statutes . . . enforce corporate contracts, reduce the costs of private
contracting by creating standard corporate forms that the parties can opt into, and provide central notice to
potential creditors that the firm has adopted limited liability.”).
203 See Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, The Role of Corporate Law in the Theory of the Firm, 28
J.L. & ECON. 179, 180 (1985) (“Each state’s corporate law provides a basic legal framework that governs the
relations of investors with senior managers, directors, and controlling shareholders. Through the law of
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all collective interests (shareholders, management, public, and corporate), then
it makes sense for the terms of the relationship between management and
shareholders to be standardized before being chopped up and sold as securities.
Even if the entity does not offer stock, standardization of the corporate form
standardizes the risks involved in buying the entity’s debt, or in securitizing the
entity’s accounts or other rights to payment.204
2. Standardization Through Anti-Standardization Doctrines
The prior subsection demonstrated that numerous legal rules constrain the
range of contractual choice and limit individuated negotiation. This subsection
now advances that argument one step further to argue that courts use antistandardization doctrines to standardize industry agreements.
Adhesion and unconscionability serve as the primary anti-standardization
doctrines in contract law. Unconscionability has two parts: procedural and
substantive.205 Procedural unconscionability derives either from ostensible
differences in bargaining power, or the hiding of surprising terms in prolix
documents.206 Substantive unfairness can reflect a range of concerns, from a
price that is several standard deviations from the mean, to consequences of
breach (such as cross-collateralization and repossession or foreclosure) that are
widely disproportionate to the value of the contract.207 A procedural flaw must
result in substantive unfairness in order for the court to rewrite the
document.208 A contract of adhesion is one which “adheres” to a deal—a

fiduciary duties, which proscribes theft and specifies standards of care and loyalty, corporate law serves as a
standard form contract that substitutes for costly, fully contingent agency contracts.”).
204 See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 202, at 770.
205 See, e.g., Discover Bank v. Super. Ct., 113 P.3d 1100, 1108 (Cal. 2005) (“To briefly recapitulate the
principles of unconscionability, the doctrine has both a procedural and a substantive element, the former
focusing on oppression or surprise due to unequal bargaining power, the latter on overly harsh or one-sided
results.” (citation omitted)).
206 See Gatton v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 344, 363 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (“[T]he contract
readily comported with the unfair surprise element of procedural unconscionability, i.e., supposedly agreedupon terms that are hidden in a prolix printed form and never brought to the attention of the weaker party.”
(citation omitted)).
207 See, e.g., Maxwell v. Fidelity Fin. Servs., Inc., 902 P.2d 51 (Ariz. 1995) (finding contract for sale of a
solar water heater presented a question of unconscionability when the heater was never properly installed, the
loans were collateralized by the purchaser’s house, and the loans carried an interest rate of 19.5%).
208 See True Light Christian Ministries Church v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 809 N.E.2d 1198, 1201
(Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (“In order for a contract provision to be unconscionable, there must exist both
‘substantive’ and ‘procedural’ unconscionability. Substantive unconscionability exists when the contract
terms are determined to be unfair and unreasonable.”).
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standardized agreement that is a mandatory portion of a commercial
transaction.209
Standardized documents are often termed “take it or leave it,” and
consumers who sign such documents are held to have lacked sufficient
bargaining power to consent to the agreement. Further, courts often find that
standardized agreements are hard to read, and theorize that consumers should
and will read simpler and clearer documents.210 As a result, standardized
contracts are often disfavored under unconscionability analysis. Some courts
even view standardized contracts as per se procedurally unconscionable
because the contract is not the result of a bargaining process.211 This makes
sense if negotiated consent is indispensable to the legal view of contract.
Standardized contracts do not result in dickered bargains. But if one shifts the
focus of contract law from securing maximum consent to securing efficient
outcomes, the unconscionability attack on standardized contracts seems
decreasingly useful.
Standardized documents are easier to read, to search for, and to search
within than individually negotiated agreements.212 Consumers can enter
standardized contracts with confidence that they know what is in them, based
on prior experience. There is a further problem with castigating standardized
contracts as take-it-or-leave-it. Such documents offer a choice: the consumer
may take her business elsewhere. Even if there is no competitor, the consumer
may choose to refuse the deal entirely. Substantive unconscionability fares
little better. Substantive unfairness is almost never determined in absolute

209

See Comb v. Paypal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1172 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
See Germantown Mfg. Co. v. Rawlinson, 491 A.2d 138, 146 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (“An unexpected
clause often appears in the boilerplate of a printed form and, if read at all, is often not understood.”); Gatton,
61 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 363 (emphasizing that the terms were unconscionable because they were hidden).
211 See Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1282 (9th Cir. 2006) (“When the weaker party is
presented the clause and told to ‘take it or leave it’ without the opportunity for meaningful negotiation,
oppression, and therefore procedural unconscionability, are present.” (citation omitted)); Comb, 218 F. Supp.
2d at 1172 (“A contract or clause is procedurally unconscionable if it is a contract of adhesion . . . . A contract
of adhesion, in turn, is a standardized contract, which, imposed and drafted by the party of superior bargaining
strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it.” (citation
omitted)); Martinez v. Master Prot. Corp., 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 663, 668 (Cal Ct. App. 2004) (“An arbitration
agreement that is an essential part of a ‘take it or leave it’ employment condition, without more, is
procedurally unconscionable.” (citation omitted)).
212 See Fairfield, supra note 97, at 1283 (“Rather, third parties gain from lower search costs outside of
litigation: The resulting unification of language makes it easier for parties to determine whether they can get
what they want without engaging in costly negotiation.”).
210
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terms. Rather, courts will look to the relative unfairness of the term against the
backdrop of the industry.213
These persistent difficulties with unconscionability analysis can be
resolved by resort to information theory. I posit that courts are often not using
unconscionability analysis to target standard terms or standardized contracts.
A contract that truly reflects the industry standard—and thus is the most
standardized—is generally safe from unconscionability attack.214 Rather,
courts use the doctrines of adhesion and unconscionability to protect standard
deals by striking outlier terms or deals. Courts do not strike prices or interest
rates as unconscionable merely because the rate or price is high. A high rate or
price that reflects the industry standard is not unconscionable.215 For example,
the Ninth Circuit determined that high interest rates are “not unusual for loans
made to high-risk borrowers”;216 and the Connecticut Supreme Court held that
loans are not unconscionable where “the interest rates . . . charged [on the
loans was not] beyond the ordinary charges then prevailing in the secondary
loan market.”217
By comparison, courts strike prices and interest rates that are statistical
outliers from the rate prevailing on similar purchases or loans.218 The
background common law rule is that courts will not inquire into the adequacy
of consideration.219 Yet, price unconscionability is a common and successful

213

See infra notes 214–18.
See, e.g., Reznor v. J. Artist Mgmt., Inc., 365 F. Supp. 2d 565, 577 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that there
was “no . . . evidence that the objected-to provisions in the . . . agreement were unusual for the industry”);
Fotomat Corp. of Fla. v. Chanda, 464 So.2d 626, 630 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (asserting that “the limitation
of liability provision was standard in the industry . . . [and t]his is clearly a commercially reasonable
consideration”); M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 970 P.2d 803, 812 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999)
(“Such clauses are standard in the software industry. Indeed, they are useful in making software affordable.”);
cf. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960) (holding that where all American car
manufacturers used the same warranty terms, the customer could not shop around for better terms).
215 See, e.g., Retail Credit Corp. v. Shorterage, No. 69465, 1996 WL 199831, at *1–*2 (Ohio Ct. App.
Apr. 25, 1996) (“In determining . . . substantive unconscionability, this court must consider the interest rates
which have been held to be ‘commercially reasonable.’”); Cal. Grocers Ass’n v. Bank of Am., 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d
396, 402 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (“Bank of America’s $3 DIR fee is actually at the low end of prices
charged . . . by other financial institutions, many of which charge between $4 and $10.”).
216 Brown v. Investors Mortgage Co., 121 F.3d 472, 478 (9th Cir. 1997).
217 Cheshire Mortgage Serv., Inc. v. Montes, 612 A.2d 1130, 1137–38 (Conn. 1992).
218 See, e.g., Carboni v. Arrospide, 2 Cal. Rptr. 845, 849 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (“We have little trouble
concluding that an interest rate of 200 percent . . . is substantively unconscionable . . . . [T]he interest
rate . . . was approximately ten times the rate then prevailing in the credit market for similar loans.”).
219 For a comprehensive treatment of consideration and gross price disparity in unconscionability, see
Frank P. Darr, Unconscionability and Price Fairness, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1819, 1822 (1994) (“[T]he successful
214
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claim.220
Contracts selling overpriced goods are regularly struck as
unconscionable.221 In determining whether the good is overpriced, courts can
only look at similar goods in the market.
Thus, the measure of
unconscionability is not absolute, but is determined by deviation from the
industry standard.
Price unconscionability cases demonstrate the strength of information-cost
analysis over informed consent analysis. If cases were determined based on
informed consent, then grossly overpriced contracts would surely be enforced.
“Of all the terms in a contract, the one most assuredly understood by the buyer
is the price term.”222 It is easier to understand why courts engage in price
evaluation by looking at information costs. In many cases the price is
packaged in such a way that makes it costly for consumers to decipher the true
cost they will ultimately pay.223 For example, it may be time-costly for
consumers to determine the ultimate cost of a good over installment payments.
Even where prices are prominently displayed, significant deviation from
the standard price still creates information costs for third parties. Recall that
under information-cost theory, the actual parties to the contract are aware of
idiosyncratic terms. A given contract term, including price, may be efficient as
between two parties. But third parties will suffer costs created by an
agreement that deviates from the standard. Even if any given price term is
fully disclosed to the parties to that particular deal, price volatility across the
run of deals causes third parties to incur search costs.

price unconscionability cases run headlong into a bedrock contract ‘rule’ that the courts will not address the
adequacy of consideration supporting an agreement.”).
220 Id. at 1822–23.
221 Id. at 1850–61 (citing Murphy v. McNamara, 416 A.2d 170, 173 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1979)) (rent to own
contract that called for consumer to be charged $1,268 for a television worth $499); Sho-Pro of Ind., Inc. v.
Brown, 585 N.E.2d 1357, 1361 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (windows sold for approximately four times their cost);
Howard v. Dialosa, 574 A.2d 995, 997 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1990) (home worth $150,000 sold for $25,000); Toker
v. Westerman, 274 A.2d 78, 79 (N.J. Dist. Ct. 1970) ($400 freezer sold for $1,230); Vom Lehn v. Astor Art
Galleries, Ltd., 380 N.Y.S.2d 532, 534, 538 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976) (art sold for $67,000 with a fair market value
of only $14,750); Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d 264, 265 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969) ($300 freezer sold
for $1,440)).
222 Id. at 1822.
223 Many lending companies offer loans over long periods of time so that each payment is low compared
to the amount borrowed. For example, Cash Call, http://www.cashcallmortgage.com/Pages/SiteRedirect.aspx
(last visited Feb. 17, 2009), offers a $2,600 loan (minus a $75 “loan fee”) for 42 payments of $216.55, or
$9,095.10 in total. See also Murphy, 416 A.2d at 173 (discussing a $499 television sold for $1,268 and that
the “agreement provided for weekly payments of $16, and further provided that if the plaintiff paid that sum
for seventy-eight successive one-week terms, she would become the owner of the television set”).
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For example, courts accept that payday loan rates are higher, as an industry,
than regular bank rates. However, if even one payday loan lender charges
idiosyncratic prices far in excess of the current payday loan standard, then
contracting prices for everyone in the industry will rise. Now every consumer
must not only calculate her own interest rate, but must compare it to at least
one other lender in order to be sure that her rate is standard. A loan shopper
must now do research to ensure that she does not fall victim to the bad apple.
One excessive rate in a barrel of competitive rates ruins the benefits of
standardization for everyone. Because this extra search cost is now tacked
onto every loan, the number of loans will fall and the industry as a whole will
suffer.
If goods have a standard market price, consumers purchase without the
need to inquire whether the vendor they are patronizing offers the best deal.224
The deviation between the price of gasoline offered at your local gas station
and the best price in town is likely to be small enough to make researching the
question (or driving around to find out) unprofitable.225 Of course, as the
differences between gas prices rose during the recent price shock, the value of
driving around looking for a better price rose. Thus, if price differences
between vendors are high, parties incur information costs shopping for the best
deal, rather than dealing with the most convenient vendor. Consequently, the
law recognizes that standard prices are valuable. Indeed, the U.C.C. does not
even require a price term to form an enforceable contract.226 Parties routinely
order without reference to price terms. Thus, the court will supply the
industry’s standard market price as a default price term.227
Courts also touch on the benefits of standardization in their discussions of
contractual surprise. The traditional view is that parties cannot consent to
terms of which they are unaware. A surprising term is unconscionable.228 Yet
courts limit this principle by reference to reasonable expectations.229 A term
224 See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The
Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1401–29 (1983) (showing that, just as
with price diversity where consumers prefer one price, the variety of contract terms can affect consumer search
costs).
225 Id. at 1401 (“[P]rice diversity can exist when it is costly for consumers to inform themselves of the
prices that different firms charge even though all consumers prefer the same price.”).
226 U.C.C. §§ 2-201, 1-205 (2002).
227 § 1-205.
228 See Germantown Mfg. Co. v. Rawlinson, 491 A.2d 138, 146 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (“The first concept
of unconscionability which we shall examine may be classified under the rubric of ‘unfair surprise.’”).
229 Id. (“If the form contains a material, risk-shifting clause which the signer would not reasonably expect
to encounter in such a transaction, courts have held that the clause may be excised as it is unconscionable.”).

FAIRFIELD GALLEYFINAL

1450

6/2/2009 12:28:13 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58

that one does not reasonably expect to find in the contract is unenforceable.230
There is a further consideration, however. The reasonable expectations are
defined by the industry standard, not by the contracting parties. As one court
noted, “a merchant in a given industry will have, by definition, a difficult time
establishing either subjective or objective ‘surprise’ regarding a proposed
contract term that is standard in the industry.”231
In determining whether a contract term must be struck for unconscionable
contractual surprise, courts ask whether the term is inside or outside of the
norm for the industry.232 If the term is outside the norm, the court finds the
term unconscionable due to surprise.233 If it is within the norm, the term is
enforceable despite the “subjective or objective” surprise of the contracting
parties.234 Under traditional contract theory, this result is hard to explain. The
parties’ intent ought to govern contract terms. However, under informationcost theory, this formulation of contractual surprise makes sense. A term that
is surprising to the industry as a whole raises contracting costs to the industry
as a whole. Courts will enforce an industry’s standard term even though it is
surprising to a contracting party. The surprise of an industry weighs more
heavily than the surprise of a single contracting party.
Nor is this analysis limited to the doctrines of unconscionability and
contracts of adhesion. Courts applying consumer protection laws or
determining unfair trade practices also enforce standardized agreements and
attack outlier contract terms.235 Standard deals are almost never deemed
unfair. But courts find that terms which “substantially deviate from industrywide practice” constitute unfair trade practices.236 Indeed, the texts of state
consumer protection statutes make this explicit.237 Such statutes decline to set
230

Id.
Aceros Prefabricados v. TradeArbed, Inc., 282 F.3d 92, 101 (2d Cir. 2002).
232 Compare Germantown Mfg. Co., 491 A.2d at 146 (striking a non-standard clause), with Aceros
Prefabricados, 282 F.3d at 101 (upholding a standard contract term).
233 See Germantown Mfg. Co., 491 A.2d at 146.
234 See Aceros Prefabricados, 282 F.3d at 101.
235 See Weigel v. Ron Tonkin Chevrolet Co., 690 P.2d 488, 493 (Or. 1984) (“The civil action authorized
by ORS 646.638 is designed to encourage private enforcement of the prescribed standards of trade and
commerce . . . .”).
236 See Frank Lopez, Using the Fair Housing Act to Combat Predatory Lending, 6 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L.
& POL’Y 73, 80 n.43 (1999) (“[L]oan fees which ‘substantially deviate from industry-wide practice’ may
constitute an unfair or deceptive trade practice in violation of Massachusetts regulations” (citing United Cos.
Lending Corp. v. Sargeant, 20 F. Supp. 2d 192, 209 (D. Mass. 1998))).
237 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-1119(c) (West 2006) (“[T]o support a finding of
unconscionability, there must be evidence of some . . . absence of meaningful choice for one of the parties,
together with contract terms that are, under standard industry practices, unreasonably favorable to the equity
231
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their own metric for unfairness, but instead penalize contract terms that deviate
from the industry standard.
Information-cost theory provides a new and better way to view these
longstanding questions of contract law. Customized contracts impose
information externalities on third parties. Standardized contracts reduce
consumers’ information costs.
Courts that adopt rules encouraging
information exchange therefore ought to consider the effect of such exchanges
on third parties. An idiosyncratic deal may be efficient for two, but inefficient
for the rest of the industry. Despite court rhetoric disfavoring standardized
agreements, some courts protect standardized deals by using antistandardization doctrines to strike outlier terms. The same principle applies to
contract interpretation. Although courts claim to determine the meaning of the
contract by reference to the parties’ intent, courts sub silentio consider the
impact of contract interpretation on the industry that relies on a standard deal,
and often favor the industry interpretation over the idiosyncratic agreement of
the parties.
IV. CHALLENGES: STANDARDIZATION AND INNOVATION
I have thus far argued that consent is costly, that standardization lowers
those costs, and that courts should and do use contract doctrine to constrain the
range of customization in mass-market contracts. There is a significant
challenge, however, to this view. Would such constraints hinder innovation in
contract law?
This Part argues that standardization fosters innovation. In the industrial
context, standardization often permits innovation, by breaking problems down
into manageable chunks.238 I argue that standardization facilitates innovation
in contract just as it does in the industrial context. Customization is not

purchaser or associate.”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-2004(2)(b)(i) (2007) (requiring independent certification
for debt managers to “ensure[] compliance with industry standards and best practices”); 66 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 2203 (West 1999) (“In adopting the standards, the commission shall consider the absence of any
applicable industry standards and practices or adopt standards in conformity with industry standards and
practices . . . .”).
238 See Henry E. Smith, Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and Information Flow, in BOILERPLATE:
THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS, supra note 13, at 164 (“Modularity is beneficial in that it makes
complexity manageable by allowing multiple people to work on a larger problem, often in very specialized
ways, without incurring the costs of intense communication. Modularity also creates options in the sense that
it allows a system to manage uncertainty; because each module can function and develop in relative isolation,
these processes can occur without the need to resolve uncertainty elsewhere in the system.”).
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synonymous with innovation, nor is standardization synonymous with
stagnation.
A. Micro-Modularity
When any system becomes complex, humans cannot work on the whole
thing at once.239 If each adjustment to any given part causes a cascade of other
changes throughout the whole, the problem becomes impossible to work on.
The problem must be broken down into parts, and the interaction between parts
must be constrained.240 Each part can then be worked on separately.
Moreover, components must be standardized in how they interact with the
whole, so that each can be removed and replaced with another.241 Imagine the
difficulty of working on a car engine that did not use standardized parts. You
could not fix the engine without re-crafting the customized parts.
This process of limiting the interaction between part and whole, and of
standardizing the components, is called modularization.242 Components are
called modules.243 Modules can be removed and replaced without affecting the
whole. When a system is modularized, a change to one part of the system does
not spill over into other parts of a system.244 From spark plugs to objectoriented programming, modularity spurs innovation.245
Standardization constrains the range of customization, in order to lower
information costs. Here we see that these lower information costs also serve
innovation, by making it possible to fix part of a problem without having to
draft an entirely new and customized contract. It is true that switching a
module will raise information costs, in the sense that one will have to inquire
which module is being used in a given system. This is like a prospective
239 See id. at 165 (“[H]uman understanding of any system is enhanced by breaking it up . . . into
modules.”).
240 Id. at 164.
241 Id. at 165 (“Forming a modular system in involves partially closing off some parts of the system and
allowing these encapsulated components to interconnect only in certain ways. This allows work to go on in
parallel and facilitates certain kinds of innovation and evolution for a simple reason: Adjustment can happen
within modules without causing major ripple effects.”).
242 See id. at 164 (“Modularity is a device that deals with complexity by decomposing a complex system
into pieces (modules), in which communications . . . are intense within the module but sparse and standardized
across modules.”).
243 Id.
244 Id. at 165 (“Adjustment can happen within modules without causing major ripple effects.”).
245 See Radin, Boilerplate Today, supra note 13, at 189 (“Modularity became important to physical
architecture in the first part of the twentieth century and to the virtual architecture of computer science in the
later twentieth century.”).
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purchaser looking under the hood of a car to ensure that the engine used is
indeed the one advertised. But the process of looking is much less costly if
engines are standardized than if each one is custom-crafted. Looking under the
hood and seeing a V8 engine tells you something. Looking under the hood at a
custom-built engine tells you less.
Contracts have become increasingly modularized. Each section is set out
under a separate heading. A severability clause limits the interaction of the
part with the whole. If one section is removed, the rest of the contract still
functions.246 Modularity of contracts permits contract drafters to swap in
components without redrafting the entire contract. That is doubtless a
significant savings.
But the rewards to consumers of component
standardization are far greater. Consumers can search for the standardized
contractual component they desire. By analogy, a search on eBay for “V8
engine” yields Jaguars, Fords, and Chevrolets, each containing the desired
component. The standardization of contract components decreases the cost of
searching for the desired deal.
B. Macro-Modularity
Standardized terms within a contract are not the only method of reducing
information costs in contract language. Entire contracts can be standardized.
This section argues that constraint of contract language, standardization, and
modularity plays significant roles in limiting information costs and fostering
innovation across contracts as well.
In contract law, the concept of industry is a tool to standardize, and thus
modularize, contracts.247 For example, consider the rule that contracts from
within the same industry are given similar construction.248 A smelting contract
is construed differently from a construction contract, even when the same
words are used.249 Courts draw from a given constrained context in construing

246 See Smith, supra note 238, at 169 (“With [a severability] term in place, the validity of each provision
in the contract can be considered in isolation of other provisions. Here, as in many systems, modularity
insulates the system as a whole from the failure of one part.”).
247 See Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Richards Mfg. Co., No. Civ. 01-4677, 2006 WL 902148, at *15 (D.N.J.
Apr. 4, 2006) (“[T]he relevant inquiry—whether or not the information at issue is commonly known in the
industry—must be directed to the parties’ competitors.”).
248 See, e.g., Ragus v. City of Chi., 628 N.E.2d 999, 999–1002 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
249 Compare Titanium Metals Corp. v. Elkem Mgmt., Inc., 191 F.R.D. 468, 470 (W.D. Pa. 1998)
(indicating that indemnification is non-standard in smelting industry), with Metric Constr. Co. v. U.S., 1 Cl. Ct.
383, 399 (1983) (allowing evidence that industry standard for indemnification was 50% of anticipated profits).
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a contract.250 This prevents spillover from one context to another, and allows
parties to craft standardized contracts, on a per-industry basis, that respond to
the needs of that particular industry.251 Within an industry, one contract’s
terms affect another because they feed into the pool of common language.
When a court construes a contract, it construes all contracts in that industry,
giving them a standardized meaning.252
When a new kind of contract is needed, it does not evolve through a lineby-line process of customization. Rather, new contracts can emerge as a block
whole, a standardized contract for a new industry.253 An example drawn from
an emerging industry may help. Social networking sites and virtual worlds are
governed by contract law.254 Those contracts began as basic software licenses
or website terms of use.255 However, online communities faced social
problems as well as software license issues.256 Thus, the End User License
Agreements needed to control social behavior (e.g., the behavior of one
MySpace member toward another) rather than merely behavior that might
affect the market for copyrighted material.257 The preexisting software license
terms did not solve these social problems.258 Online community providers
needed new contracts to deal with these new issues.259

250

See Stender v. Twin City Foods, Inc., 510 P.2d 221, 225 (Wash. 1973) (noting that the
“definition . . . must be determined in light of reasonable industry custom and usage . . . even though words in
their ordinary or legal meaning are unambiguous”).
251 See Thomas & Betts Corp., 2006 WL 902148, at *15.
252 See, e.g., Ragus, 628 N.E.2d at 999–1002 (construing terms of contract to comport with industry
custom and practice).
253 Note the similarities between End User License Agreements in virtual worlds. See Entropia,
https://account.entropiauniverse.com/pe/en/rich/107004.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2009) (retaining all title and
rights to all objects and virtual items and specifically denying any ownership by the user); Second Life, http://
secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php (last visited Feb. 17, 2009) (owning all data stored on its servers); World of
Warcraft, http://www.worldofwarcraft.com/legal/eula.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2009) (claiming ownership
and rights to all characters, names, dialog, sounds, animations, and anything else within the world); cf. Bragg
v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 606 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (finding procedural unconscionability in
Second Life’s Terms of Service arbitration agreement, because it was “the first and only virtual world to
specifically grant its participants property rights in virtual land”).
254 See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Anti-Social Contracts: The Contractual Governance of Virtual Worlds, 53
MCGILL L.J. 427 (2008) [hereinafter Fairfield, Anti-Social Contracts].
255 Id.
256 Id.
257 See id. at 429.
258 Id.
259 Id.
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These new contracts did not evolve line-by-line. Rather, the contracts
emerged as a block.260 Even though the novel terms of the contracts had not
been tested by courts, the terms were standardized.261 The terms across
contracts were surprisingly similar for a new industry. Note that the traditional
academic explanation for boilerplate—that it permits parties to benefit from a
private conversation between drafter and court that results in court-approved
terms—does not seem to explain this situation, in which the standardized
contracts had not been tested in court.
Contract innovation does not seem to be constant and organic, but “sticky,”
and “chunky.”262 For a while, contracts don’t seem to change and are locked
into court-approved language. Then a new industry needs a new contract. A
new industry is a new box. Inside the box, industry-specific contracts can be
developed without regard to spillover to other industries. Standardization
within industries constrains customization. Industry contracts will be
construed in light of industry custom and practice, even in the face of solid
unwritten evidence of the parties’ actual intent.263 But these constraints do not
cause stagnation. In contract law, as elsewhere, micro-modularity and macromodularity make innovation possible.264
Another way to explain the block emergence of new, standard terms is by
reference to local and global optima. A standardized contract within an
industry is a local optimum: it represents one good mix of information costs
and features.265 A global optimum (or a superior local optimum) is one that
represents a better mix of costs, but is costly to achieve in the short term.266
For example, a slightly better contract may be rejected because the information
260

See supra note 253 for examples of industry standardized contracts.
See Fairfield, Anti-Social Contracts, supra note 254, at 438.
262 See STAN J. LIEBOWITZ & STEPHEN E. MARGOLIS, WINNERS, LOSERS & MICROSOFT 9 (1999) (“A
particular kind of network effect occurs as technology develops. As more firms or households use a
technology, there is a greater pool of knowledge for users to draw upon. As we gain experience and
confidence in a technology, the expected payoff to someone who adopts it may become greater. Once a few
people have tried a technology, others know what can be expected.”).
263 See supra Part IV.C.
264 See infra Part V.
265 See Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90 GEO. L.J. 883, 899 (2002) (describing
choice of law provisions and the difference between global and local optima, noting that “[i]f the costs and
benefits of an activity are distributed unevenly across countries, national policies will diverge from the global
optimum. The policy of an individual government may be either more or less permissive than the global
optimum, depending on the distribution of these costs and benefits”).
266 Id. (“In certain instances, for example, a globally optimal policy may cause a net loss in one or more
countries when compared to the noncooperative, suboptimal outcome. In those cases, the losing countries will
prefer the suboptimal outcome, frustrating efforts to achieve an efficient international regime.”).
261
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costs created by a non-standard agreement are greater than the cost-savings
generated by standardization. While standardization savings outweigh the
benefits of novelty, the old contract remains the standard. However, when that
balance tips, the contract will seem not to evolve, but to “snap” to a new
position: one where the benefit of the novel contract term outweighs the gains
of standardization.267 Following the snap, information costs will again fall, as
the new term becomes standard.
V. PROPOSED CHANGES
The prior Parts have argued that consent is costly, that standardization
reduces that cost, and that courts already have some tools to protect standard
agreements by limiting idiosyncratic terms. This Part suggests several ways
courts might change from current practice when dealing with mass-market
contracts. The overarching principle is that courts should minimize the cost of
informed consent by constraining contract language to standard terms, rather
than ensuring informed consent by redrafting contracts. Further, courts should
enforce standard terms because they lower the cost of information, rather than
disfavor such terms based on some intuition that they raise information costs
because consumers do not read them.
Courts should stop treating contractual consent as binary—as existing or
not existing. Rather, they should ask how much consent the consumer has
bought, and whether that is a reasonably efficient amount to buy. When courts
use the doctrine of unconscionability to force buyers to buy more information
than is efficient, they cause the usual economic harms. Similarly, the term
“contract of adhesion” is empty of meaning, and its application should be
reformed. A contract of adhesion is problematic under liberal contract theory
because it is a “take it or leave it” bargain that vitiates the consumer’s ability to
express free will through consent.
But under information theory, a
standardized agreement reduces the consumer’s information costs. Thus, to
the extent courts wish to disfavor standardized agreements, they should
distinguish not based on “adhesiveness.” Courts should instead distinguish

267 See Gaia Bernstein, The Paradoxes of Technological Diffusion: Genetic Discrimination and Internet
Privacy, 39 CONN. L. REV. 241, 247 (2006) (“Interactive technologies are often characterized by a critical
mass point quality (and related network effects) where the technology is of little use to the adopter unless a
critical mass of people adopts it. Once the critical mass point is reached, diffusion accelerates, social norms
become quickly entrenched and the technology is less likely to be abandoned.”).
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between contracts that embody standard terms and documents that attempt to
hide idiosyncratic terms.
Courts should stop using the fiction of the consumer who reads, and thus
consents, to mass-market contracts. Forcing consumers to buy more
information than they desire is not a useful goal. This rhetorical flourish is
used by courts that feel the need to retain some vestige of contractual consent
in the mass-market context. Reading a mass-market contract is an economic
loss. It is almost never worth the time it takes. Courts should cease redrafting
contracts that no one reads. Courts, not consumers, are the real readers of
contracts. If the court does not understand the contract, then the contract is
likely to be construed in a way that the drafter does not like. That is incentive
enough for the drafter to get it right.
Courts should be very cautious about adopting information-forcing rules,
even permissive ones, in the mass-market context. Information-forcing rules
encourage the exchange of idiosyncratic information.268 This may be efficient
in individual deals, but is often inefficient across the range of deals.
Finally, courts should focus on standardized meanings rather than
individuated meanings when they construe contracts. This is different from the
usual divide between objective and subjective meanings of a term. When
courts construe contract terms, they usually understand (although rarely state)
that the beneficiaries of their labors are subsequent contracting parties. Thus,
courts should not only construe terms based on objective evidence, but should
further give weight to standard meanings of terms. This could even take the
form of a presumption against customization in the mass-market context,
which would be a complete departure from current court practice.
CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to shift the central question of contractual
consent from “does informed consent exist?” to “how much informed consent
is efficient for the buyer to buy and the seller to sell?” Along the way, the
Article has attempted to demonstrate that the usual criticisms of standardized
contracts are not persuasive, and that some of the information-forcing rules of
recent literature might be a bad idea.

268

See Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Exch. Div.).
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The Article makes a limited argument. In mass-market contexts, the costs
of informing consumers of the terms of contracts often outweigh the benefits
of doing so, and therefore courts should critically reexamine the network of
doctrines that force companies to make disclosures no consumer ever reads. In
so doing, this analysis leaves intact traditional contract doctrine in the
negotiation-centered setting, where information exchange is a critical part of
the negotiation process.
But even this limited argument does much good for harmonizing contract
law with practice. Consumers do not read mass-market contracts. Such
contracts are routinely standardized and choice is constrained. Courts should
understand why, rather than resist. Under preexisting contract theory, courts
feel compelled to reform standardized contracts to reflect individual informed
consent.
Under information-cost theory, standard deals are efficient
mechanisms that courts should protect.
Change may be slow in coming. Even where contract theorists have looked
at the costs of securing contractual consent, they have endorsed informationforcing rules that encourage the exchange of idiosyncratic information. Yet
even this supposedly efficient exchange does not match contracting practice.
We do not reveal our secret vulnerabilities to sellers in order to get increased
insurance, nor do we bargain prices down based on the revelation of secret
strengths. One-size-fits-all contracts permit consumers to cheaply compare
deals, and to enter into deals without inquiring as to what the components of
the deal are. Knowing this, sellers do not offer standardized contracts because
it permits them to reap cost savings. Sellers offer standardized deals because
consumers demand them.

